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REGULATING THE MONEYCHANGERS 
Jerry Markham* 
INTRODUCTION 
“The foreign exchange1 . . . market is the most liquid sector of the 
global economy and generates the largest amount of cross-border payments 
on a daily basis, with an average daily turnover of $5.3 trillion.”2  That 
market is critical to commerce because it “facilitates international trade and 
investments through the determination of exchange rates, conversion of 
national currencies and transfer of funds.”3  This critically requires 
effective regulation on a global basis, especially in the United States, which 
is a hub for such trading because of the importance of the dollar in 
international trade and finance.4 
The foreign exchange market is now regulated domestically by no less 
than five regulators: the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (Fed).5  Those multiple and redundant regulators have not proved to 
be effective or efficient in preventing abusive business practices.  This is 
demonstrated by the recent civil and criminal actions that charged several 
large banks with fraud and manipulation of the foreign exchange market on 
 
 *   Professor, Florida International University College of Law. 
 1.  “The expression ‘foreign-exchange’ refers to the exchange of money in one 
country for money in another.” THOMAS YORK, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE 
1 (1920). 
 2.  Federal Reserve Board Bank of New York, Managing Foreign Exchange, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/financial-market-
infrastructure-and-reform/managing-foreign-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/GS6B-2DZJ] 
(accessed on April 26, 2015). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  To illustrate, the dollar was involved in eighty-seven percent of the daily turnover 
volume of foreign exchange in 2013. Table-Global FX Volume Reaches $5.3 Trillion a Day 
in 2013-BIS, Reuters, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/bis-survey-
volumes-idUSL6N0GZ34R20130905 [https://perma.cc/5NYY-5HFH] (accessed on July 31, 
2015). 
 5.  See infra note 446 and accompanying text (describing that regulation). 
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a massive scale, with settlements now totaling over $10 billion.6 
The size and nature of the misconduct in those cases has called into 
question the effectiveness of the existing regulatory structure that allowed 
such practices to go undetected for several years.7  This article responds to 
these concerns by advocating the creation of a single business conduct 
regulator that would replace the existing five regulators.  The article 
recommends that the SEC and CFTC be consolidated to act as the sole 
business conduct regulator for the foreign exchange market, as well as for 
the markets they now regulate.  Both of these agencies have experience in 
regulating foreign exchange, and both have as their mission the sanctioning 
of fraud and manipulation. 
The author would leave prudential regulation of the interbank 
exchange market to bank regulators that focus on the safety and soundness 
of the banking system.  Foreign exchange payment and settlement systems 
are largely utilized by banks that can fail as a result of weaknesses in those 
systems.  The bank regulators have historically focused on concerns over 
such weaknesses and should continue to do so.8 
The article is divided into eight parts, including this Introduction.  Part 
II covers the history of the foreign exchange market.  Parts III-VI describe 
the development of regulation in four segments of this market: (i) the 
commercial interbank market; (ii) exchange traded derivatives; (iii) retail 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives; and (iv) retail OTC cash transactions.  
Part VII describes the existing ineffective multi-agency regulatory system 
and advocates for the creation of a single business conduct regulator. 
Finally, Part VIII concludes by proposing changes to the current regulatory 
framework of the foreign exchange market, noting that if these changes are 






 6.  See infra note 200 and accompanying text (describing those settlements). 
 7.  Huw Jones, Global Regulators to Meet in London, Fix Rules After Rigging 
Scandals, Reuters, May 22, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/22/us-britain-
markets-regulator-idUSKBN0O71F320150522 [https://perma.cc/96R9-KCJV] (accessed on 
May 26, 2015). See also Regulation Alone Will Not Restore Faith in Markets, FIN. TIMES 
(LONDON), May 26, 2015, (describing how regulators are rethinking their regulatory 
approach to benchmarks such as foreign currency exchange rates), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8a41dd82-0399-11e5-a70f-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3xpQTnOaa [https://perma.cc/JF66-2V27] (accessed on May 27, 
2015). 
 8.  See infra notes 182, 434, 443 and accompanying text (describing that prudential 
regulation). 
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I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
MARKET  
A. In the Beginning 
The history of foreign exchange in ancient times is somewhat murky 
and predated by exchanges of metal and barter transactions.9  Coins as 
currency appear to have their origin in Lydia, where they were first minted 
in the seventh century B.C.10  The use of coins as a currency soon spread to 
Greece and Rome.11  From there money in the form of coins spread to the 
economies of most developing civilizations.12  This coined currency 
included bezants, ecus, florins, ducats, agustalias, pfennigs, hellers, 
stuivers, weisspfennigs, blankes, pfunds, orrts, gulden, crona, anglots, 
pesos, nobles, and dinars.13  China is attributed with the creation of paper 
money, as Marco Polo discovered during his journey there in the thirteenth 
century.  This practice eventually spread to the West.14 
Currencies often circulated outside their country of origin, and 
moneychangers began exchanging the currency of one country for the 
currency of another.  This required the moneychangers to assess their 
relative values.  The most visible of these moneychangers operated in 
ancient Jerusalem where they changed the currency of arriving pilgrims.  
Those merchants performed a valuable service, but they were not popular 
with everyone, as demonstrated by the famous act of Jesus in overturning 
their tables and casting them from the Temple.15 
 
 9.  PAUL EINZIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, 11-14 (2D ED. 1970). 
 10.  The British Museum, The Origins of Coinage, 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/themes/money/the_origins_of_coinage.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3EPG-SWRB] (accessed on Feb. 5, 2015). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Gold drove ancient commerce as a medium of exchange: 
Conceivably gold could perform its monetary function in whatever shapes and 
sizes it chanced to be. But in that case it would be necessary on every occasion 
of its transfer, from buyer to seller, or between lender and borrower, to verify its 
quantity by means of a pair of scales and a more or less elaborate metallurgical 
test. It is to obviate the need of such internal weighings and testings that the 
metal is fashioned into stamped disks of regular shape, called ‘coins’ which 
cannot be tampered with without detection, each of a standard weight as 
expressed by the monetary unit. 
THOMAS YORK, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1920). 
 13.  JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 16 (2002). 
 14.  JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY 126 (1997). 
 15.  PAUL EINZIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 19 (2D ED. 1970). The activities 
of the Jerusalem money changers have also been described as follows: 
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Moneychangers appeared in Europe in the late Middle Ages.16  Those 
merchants tested and weighed coins being exchanged, and currency was 
examined to see if it was counterfeit or debased.17  These moneychangers 
also exercised a banking function by safekeeping coins for merchants and 
 
In the period of the Second Temple vast numbers of Jews streamed to Palestine 
and Jerusalem ‘out of every nation under heaven’ taking with them considerable 
sums of money in foreign currencies. This is referred to in the famous instance 
of Jesus’ driving the money changers out of the Temple (Matt. 21:12). Not only 
did these foreign coins have to be changed but also ordinary deposits were often 
handed over to the Temple authorities for safe deposit in the Temple treasury. 
Thus Jerusalem became a sort of central bourse and exchange mart, and the 
Temple vaults served as ‘safe deposits’ in which every type of coin was 
represented. The business of money exchange was carried out by the shulḥani 
(‘exchange banker’), who would change foreign coins into local currency and 
vice versa. People coming from distant countries would bring their money in 
large denominations rather than in cumbersome small coins. The provision of 
small change was a further function of the shulḥani. For both of these kinds of 
transactions the shulḥani charged a small fee (agio), called in rabbinic literature 
a kolbon (a word of doubtful etymology but perhaps from the Greek κόλλυβος 
‘small coin.’ This premium seems to have varied from 4 percent to 8 percent. 
The shulḥani served also as a banker, and would receive money on deposit for 
investment and pay out an interest at a fixed rate, although this was contrary to 
Jewish law. 
Jewish Virtual Library, Money Changers, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0014_0_14119.html 
[https://perma.cc/84X5-Q9BF] (accessed on Mar. 5, 2015) (citations omitted). 
 16.  As one source notes: 
If you only think about the enormous variety of coins in circulation, it becomes 
quite obvious money changers played an important role in the economic life of 
a medieval citizen. You could find them in the neighbourhood of city gates, the 
market square or the townhall. Easy to find for foreign merchants and travellers 
who had to pay them a visit in order to change their money into local currency. 
Just as banks today, money changers received a commission on their 
transactions. 
National Bank of Belgium Museum, The Money Changer’s Bench, 
http://www.nbbmuseum.be/2008/01/money-changers-bench.htm [https://perma.cc/WNT3-
G7GJ] (accessed on Mar. 5, 2015). 
 17.  It has been noted that: 
On the one hand the money changer was a private businessman but on the other 
hand he also had a public function. Hence, he was closely controlled by the 
authorities. He actually had two main tasks: as a public officer he had to 
withdraw all forged and clipped coins and as a private businessman he was 
mainly involved in changing different coin types. The first task was particularly 
important to ensure a sound circulation of money. Only money changers had the 
right to buy abrased or debased coins at metal value. This coined metal was 
further sold to goldsmiths or mint masters. 
Id. 
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issuing certificates of deposits that the merchant could pass as money.18 
Moneychangers also became involved in the trade in bills of 
exchange.  These instruments operated much like the modern check in that 
the drawer was directing a third party (today this would be the bank) to pay 
the holder of the bill a stated amount in a specified currency.19  Bills of 
exchange were often used in foreign trade, giving rise to a need for 
moneychangers to convert payments into the currency of the holder.20  Bills 
of exchange that were payable in a foreign currency were a convenient 
means for negating the need to transfer coins for payment in a foreign 
country.  Bills of exchange were also used to avoid usury prohibitions by 
disguising interest through a favorable exchange rate.21 
Various governmental restrictions were placed on early 
moneychangers in Europe.  Commonly, moneychangers were required to 
obtain licenses from the ruling authority.  “In most countries they had to 
conform to tightly drawn official market regulations the infringement of 
which entailed severe penalties.”22  Most authorities also set official 
exchange rates. England went further.  Between the twelfth and 
seventeenth centuries the English Crown banned private moneychangers, 
placing that function into the office of the Royal Exchanger.23 
Despite their regulation, abuses were present in early foreign 
exchange markets.  Critics of this market often claimed that exchange rates 
were being manipulated.  In some instances, this manipulation was 
designed to protect local growers from foreign competition by making the 
cost of foreign goods more expensive.24  In addition, “[t]here was much 
written about the speculative activity of skillful and sinister syndicates 
which were supposed to influence exchange rates to their advantage by 
spreading false rumors or by other methods.”25  In the sixteenth century, 
betting on exchange rates became popular through futures style 
transactions, which developed into the more modern foreign exchange 
market.26  The Dutch government banned such transactions in 1541.27 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Business Dictionary, Bills of Exchange (BOF), 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bill-of-exchange-BOE.html 
[https://perma.cc/HA57-LBY4] (accessed on Mar. 5, 2015). 
 20.  EINZIG, supra note 10, at 63-64. 
 21.   Id. at 69-70. 
 22.   Id. at 103. 
 23.   Id. at 104. 
 24.   Id. at 80. 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Id. at 120. 
 27.   Id. 
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B. Foreign Exchange in America 
Before the Revolution, the American colonies had no single currency 
they could call their own.  The individual colonies issued bills of credit that 
served in a limited fashion as a local currency.  However, their value 
fluctuated wildly and was often discounted when used as currency.  To 
prevent abuses in the over issuance of these bills, the Crown passed 
legislation restricting their issuance.28  Otherwise, foreign coins, bills of 
exchange, transactions on account and barter were used as the basis for 
most colonial period commercial and retail transactions.29 
After the Revolution, merchants specializing in foreign exchange 
made their appearance in the United States.30  They included Brown Bros. 
& Co. in New York and its Baltimore affiliate, Alexander Brown & Sons.  
These merchants purchased bills of exchange from other merchants and 
issued their own bills.31  By 1817, references were being made to “monied 
men” carrying on “extensive and profitable operations” in foreign exchange 
between U.S. cities.32  However, at least until the 1830s, commercial banks 
had little involvement in the foreign exchange market because “foreign 
exchange transactions were still not accepted as assuredly the proper 
province of such an institution.”33  By the 1830s, “permission could be 
secured . . . for the mere profit making exigencies of the exchange 
merchants themselves, [i.e., speculation] . . . . [F]oreign-exchange trading 
was, indeed, ceasing to be wholly a supplementary element in international 
merchandising and was growing into a distinct and complicated business of 
itself.”34 
The foreign exchange market between America and London was 
disrupted by the Civil War.35  However, the British and American 
Exchange Banking Corp. Ltd. was operating a foreign exchange business 
that used bills of lading attached to bills of exchange as collateral.  The 
company also handled gold shipments.  After the Civil War, speculators 
facilitated the rise of a more sophisticated trading system in foreign 
currency exchange.  “In this connection mention may be made of a 
 
 28.  MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 50-55. 
 29.  Boston Federal Reserve Bank, History of Colonial Money, 
https://www.bostonfed.org/education/pubs/historyo.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV2W-8LBR] 
(accessed on March 5, 2015). 
 30.  A.H. Cole, Evolution of the Foreign-Exchange Market of the United States, 1 J. 
ECON. & BUS. HIST. 384, 390 (1929). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 396. 
 33.  Id. at 390, 394. 
 34.  Id. at 404. 
 35.  Id. at 417-418. 
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phenomenon peculiar to the boom periods around 1866 and 1873—the use 
of ‘borrowed’ exchange for speculative purposes.”36  The post-Civil War 
speculators borrowed time bills from foreign exchange firms, sold those 
borrowed bills and used the funds generated by the sale to speculate in 
other markets.  Further, technological advances of communications by the 
1880s radically increased security speculators’ (who served as the 
predecessors of today’s arbitrageurs) availability of foreign exchange 
transactions, rendering feasible the development of a ‘retail’ market in 
currencies.37 
Futures contracts in foreign exchange were developed in the 1870s for 
grain exporters by the foreign exchange operations of Alexander Brown & 
Sons in Baltimore, Maryland.  The exporters entering into those contracts 
were seeking to hedge the risks of foreign currency fluctuations between 
the time of the acceptance of a foreign grain order and its payment.38  Such 
futures contracts were not traded on exchanges but were sold over-the-
counter.39 
C. The Role of Gold and Silver in Foreign Exchange 
Gold and silver historically played a central role in the foreign 
exchange market in the U.S. because those precious metals were, as in 
ancient times, the standard used to value one currency against another.  
There has been a long running debate of the proper ratio in valuing silver 
against gold.  In ancient times, the ratio was generally from twelve to 
twenty parts silver to one part gold.40  The Coinage Act passed by the U.S. 
Congress in 1792 set the value of gold to silver at a ratio of 15:1, which 
was a measure for pricing gold and silver coins.41  The Coinage Act of 
1834 also authorized debt payments in gold and silver coins from England, 
France, Portugal and Brazil.42  Moneychangers continued to deal in other 
coins.  For example, the firm of Spofford and Tileston was offering a 
premium for Mexican coins in May 1835.43  Exchange in America was a 
confusing matter.  Prices for Spanish coins were often quoted in British 
 
 36.  Id. at 410. 
 37.  Id. at 415-416. 
 38.  Edwin J. Perkins, The Emergence of a Futures Market for Foreign Exchange in the 
United States, 11 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 193, 200, 202 (1974). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  PETER L. BERNSTEIN, THE POWER OF GOLD 25 (2000).  In Egypt around 4000 B.C. 
the ratio of gold was set at what appears to be a historic low of 10:1. 
 41.  1 Stat. 246 (1792). 
 42.  4 Stat. 669 (1834). 
 43.  MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 179. 
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valuations, rather than by their dollar value.44  However, the Coinage Act of 
1857 sought to stop that business by prohibiting the use of foreign coins as 
legal tender.45 
The Civil War gave rise to much speculation in gold on which the 
value of Union currency, the “Greenbacks,” was based.  The value of that 
currency would rise and fall with each Union victory or defeat.  The price 
of the $20 gold double-eagle coins, which contained about an ounce of 
gold, fluctuated during the war between $135 and $285.46  The 
Confederacy created a unique instrument for foreign exchange.  It was a tri-
valued bond (this was the so-called Erlanger Bond named after its principal 
underwriter).  The purchaser of the bond was given the option of receiving 
interest and principal payments in cotton, British sterling or French francs.  
However, the bond became worthless at the end of the war.47 
Speculation in gold continued after the Civil War and culminated in 
1869 with Jay Gould’s epic attempt to corner that market.  Gould had 
suborned officials in the Grant administration to withhold government sales 
as a means to drive up its price.  However, the corner was broken after 
President Grant became suspicious and ordered large gold sales.48  More 
important for the foreign exchange business was the post-war debate over 
whether the country should continue the paper currency used by the North 
during that conflict.  Many believed that the government should return to a 
“specie” standard in which only gold and/or silver would be accepted as 
legal tender.  It was thought that this would curb the speculation that had 
occurred during the war.49  Such a specie standard would also reduce 
 
 44.  As one author noted: 
[P]eople were perfectly used to dealing in Spanish coins and giving them British 
valuations.  Even the dollar, capstone of the Jeffersonian system, struggled for 
recognition.  Into the 1850s the people of New England called a dollar six 
shillings. Nine shillings was $1.50; ten and six meant $1.75.  A Spanish real 
was a New York shilling; eight reals made a dollar, and one real was worth 
twelve and a half cents.  Ten reals made $1.25, or ten shillings, though in 
Virginia a dollar and a quarter meant seven shillings and sixpence. 
Americans had to price things in curious fractions, according to the coins available to them. 
Goods went for 6 1/4, 12 1/2, 18 3/4, 25, 37 1/2, 50, 62 1/2, and 75 cents.  Things cost $1 
1/4 or $5 7/8. 
JASON GOODWIN, GREENBACK: THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR AND THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 124 
(2003). 
 45.  11 Stat. 163 (1857). 
 46.  MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 270-71.  In 1864, Congress prohibited futures trading 
in gold but this only caused the price of gold to rise against the Greenback and the 
legislation was repealed two weeks after its enactment.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 99-115 (1986). 
 49.  MARKHAM, supra note 14, at 339-49. 
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concerns over risks caused by fluctuations in foreign exchange rates in 
commercial transactions because gold would be exchanged for gold in 
settling foreign debts.50 
The specie debate was long running and contentious, even giving rise 
to political parties.  A specie standard was opposed by farmer organizations 
that sought to inflate the currency and thereby inflate commodity prices.  In 
contrast, commercial interests sought to call in paper currency and return to 
a more stable gold standard.  A subset of this debate was an effort to treat 
silver more favorably than gold, which would inflate prices because of its 
greater supply.51  The Supreme Court entered the fray through the so-called 
legal tender cases, which gave conflicting rulings on whether greenbacks 
were required to be accepted as legal tender by anyone other than the 
federal government.  Broad legal tender status was eventually recognized 
by the Court.52 
The Resumption Act of 1875 declared that it was the intention of the 
federal government to resume specie as the standard for legal tender.  
However, a “free Silver” movement and the “Greenback” or “National” 
party continued to fight that resumption.  They supported the Silver 
Coinage Act of 1878, which required the Treasury to buy and coin silver 
that could be used as collateral for silver certificates that would circulate as 
currency.  Congress also voted to reduce the amount of outstanding 
greenbacks, which brought them to par with gold for the first time.  This 
debate over the role of gold and silver gave rise to one of the most famous 
political speeches in American history—the so-called “Cross of Gold” 
speech by William Jennings Bryan in 1896.53  Despite his rhetoric, Bryan 
lost the presidential race and the argument.  The United States also went on 
 
 50.  For example, when the United States and England were both on a gold standard, “a 
bank deposit in New York [wa]s equivalent to gold tendered in New York, while a bank 
deposit in London [wa]s equivalent to gold tendered in London.”  YORK, supra note 2 at 1. 
 51.  See generally, GOODWIN, supra note 46, at 255-84 (describing these political 
issues). 
 52.  Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868); Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. 229 (1868); 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870). 
 53.  Bryan famously stated in this speech that: 
[H]aving behind us the producing masses of the nation and the world. . . the 
commercial interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we 
shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them, you shall not 
press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns.  You shall not crucify 
mankind upon a cross of gold. 
William Jennings Bryan, Speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago: Cross 
of Gold (July 9, 1896), http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5354/ [https://perma.cc/3BSR-
GHWD]. 
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a gold standard in 1900 with the passage of the Gold Standard Act.54 
The adoption of a gold standard here and abroad helped to stabilize 
exchange rates among the countries adopting that standard, which included 
a majority of nations.55  “During the gold standard, exchange rates were 
generally quite stable and anchored by arbitrage of gold versus currencies 
pegged to gold.”56  Gold might still fluctuate in value between two foreign 
markets on the gold standard when there was an imbalance of supply and 
demand in one market.57  However, the risks from such fluctuations could 
be hedged.58  Speculators and arbitrageurs could also profit from such 
differences, but profits were limited to the cost of transporting gold to the 
market with an imbalance.59 
The gold standard fell apart in 1914 with the outbreak of World War I, 
which caused the warring nations to fall out of a fixed rate regimen.60 
For a short time conditions in the Foreign Exchange markets became 
chaotic.  The interruption of relations with enemy countries made it 
impossible to carry out the large number of foreign-exchange contracts 
entered into before the war, and it became difficult to carry out a further 
large number of contracts whose execution depended and turned on the 
execution of contracts with enemy countries.61 
Efforts were made to stabilize sterling by pegging operations of the 
government and other measures,62 but in “neutral markets the exchanges of 
 
 54.  Jerry W. Markham, Gold Standard Act of 1900, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3407400146.html [https://perma.cc/P3T2-9UMP] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015).  The Wizard of Oz was written as an allegory of the fight over 
the gold standard. William Jennings Bryan was portrayed as the cowardly lion. 
WEATHERFORD, supra note 15, at 174-77. 
 55.  Michael D. Bordo, Gold Standard, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GoldStandard.html [https://perma.cc/5G7C-XWHK] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 56.  Scott Mixon, The Foreign Exchange Option Market, 1917-1921 5 (Jan. 26, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333442 [https://perma.cc/S9P3-JCNL]. 
 57.  YORK, supra note 2, at 21-22 (1920). 
 58.  Id. at 53-54. 
 59.  Id. at 24-25. As one source described this speculation: 
They will purchase exchange with money borrowed in New York and loan out 
the funds in the London market. Subsequently, when their advances mature, 
they will recall their funds by selling exchange, and at the same time retire their 
borrowings and New York. They may also speculate by purchasing exchange 
for future delivery. 
Id. at 24. 
 60.  Mixon, supra note 57. 
 61.  EINZIG, supra note 10, at 236. 
 62.  The U.S. dollar was pegged to the British pound at a set rate during the war. JERRY 
W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 73 (2002). 
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belligerent fluctuated freely, and there was a great deal of speculation.”63 
In 1919, after the conclusion of World War I, government pegging 
operations ended, including those by the United States and the value of the 
British pound and French franc dropped sharply.64  Exchange rates 
“witnessed wild and entirely incalculable fluctuations, and speculation 
figured prominently both as a cause and as an effect of these 
fluctuations.”65  This period saw an evolution in the foreign exchange 
markets; telegraphic transfers replaced bills of exchange and a spot and 
forward market in actual currency emerged.”.66  “Anecdotal evidence from 
contemporaries suggests that currency trading became a substantial activity 
starting in the 1920s, as speculators sought to exploit the new profit 
opportunities associated with floating exchange rates.”67 
This period of floating currency exchange rates during the 1920s was 
“remarkable for its great turbulence due to the political and economic 
conditions that existed in Europe at the time.”68  The rapid and 
unprecedented depreciation of the German mark has been well 
documented, as has the devastating inflation experienced by that country.69  
Many blamed that inflation on speculators in the currency, rather than on 
the government policies and war related claims that were the actual cause.70  
There were also “concerted speculative attacks on various currencies, most 
 
 63.  EINZIG, supra note 10, at 237. 
 64.  BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION, 1919-1939 100 (1995). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Olivier Accominotti & David Chambers, If You’re So Smart: The Currency 
Trading Record of John Maynard Keynes (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/Accominotti%20-
%20Chambers_IfYou'reSoSmart_20Sep2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY7D-TUZS]. 
 67.  Id. at 1. 
 68.  Richard T. Baillie & Young-Wook Han, Central Bank Intervention and Properties 






 69.  See Germany’s Hyperinflation-Phobia, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2013  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/11/economic-history-1 
[https://perma.cc/7T4G-4DSF] (accessed on March 20, 2015) (describing that hyperinflation 
and the fears that it continues to raise in Germany). 
 70.  Robert L. Hetzel, German Monetary History in the First Half of the Twentieth 
Century, at 11 (2002) 
https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2002/winter/pdf/he
tzel.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8MY-BDMV] (accessed on March 21, 2015). Germany ended its 
hyperinflation in 1923 by pegging the mark to the dollar at the then prevailing exchange rate 
of 4,200 billion marks to the dollar. Id. at p. 8. 
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notably the French franc, which in turn prompted the French Government 
to engage in a number of ‘bear squeezes’ in the hope of deterring future 
speculation.”71 
The business of foreign exchange grew rapidly in the United States 
after the conclusion of World War I.  By 1920, the Wall Street Journal was 
carrying a column on “Foreign Exchange” that analyzed causes of currency 
price fluctuations and carried price quotes for several European and South 
American currencies.72  Brokers were advertising their foreign exchange 
operations.  For example, the Park Union Foreign Banking Corporation in 
New York advertised in the New York Times in 1921 that it had $22 million 
in resources and that its “Foreign Exchange Department [was] taking care 
of the foreign exchange business in sterling, francs, lire and marks, as well 
as Scandinavian, Central European and Far Eastern exchange for over two 
hundred banks within the United States, for many foreign banks and 
commercial firms.”73  Another New York firm, Morton Lachenbruch & 
Co., advertised that large profits could be made from the purchase of 
foreign bonds “because they rise in Dollar Value in proportion to exchange 
rates.”74  The American Express Company made similar claims.75 
Options trading was a popular tool for speculation in foreign currency 
in the United States.  Retail German-American investors were particular 
targets of firms hawking options on the German mark.76  Options were also 
sold on the Russian ruble.77  These options on foreign exchange were often 
sold “at prices too exorbitant to attract any but the uninformed . . .”78  The 
exploitation of retail foreign currency investors involved other frauds, 
including one of the most notorious financial scandals in all history—that 
of Charles Ponzi.79  His scheme promised small investors, usually Italian 
immigrants, quarterly profits of fifty percent through the purchase of postal 
reply coupons in Europe using European currencies.  Ponzi claimed that 
these postal certificates would be redeemed in other currencies at favorable 
 
 71.  Richard T. Baillie, Tim Bollerslev & Michael R. Redfearn, Bear Squeezes, 
Volatility Spillovers and Speculative Attacks in the Hyperinflation 1920s Foreign Exchange, 
12 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 511, 512 (1993). 
 72.  See, e.g., Foreign Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1920, at 12; Foreign Exchange, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1922, at 4 (describing the causes for fluctuations in price for foreign 
currencies). 
 73.  Advertisement for Park-Union, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1921) at 27. 
 74.  Advertisement for Morton Lachenbruch & Co., N.Y.  TIMES (June 1, 1921) at 30. 
 75.  Rise in Exchanges Aiding Bond Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1921, at 29. 
 76.  Mixon, supra note 57, at 2-3. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Piratical Practices in Field of Foreign Exchange, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1922, at 4. 
 79.  See MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI’S SCHEME (2005) (describing this fraud). 
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exchange rates.80  In actuality, Ponzi was simply paying his investors 
“profits” from their own funds and those of new investors.81 
The Wall Street Journal reported in 1922 that other Ponzi-like 
schemes were occurring in foreign exchange transactions directed at ethnic 
groups in Chicago.  One operator was conducting “blind pool and exchange 
operation[s], so-called dividends on which actually come from the deposits 
of constantly recruited ‘investors’. . . .”82  Another form of fraud on 
unsophisticated investors was reported to have involved “the sale of 
counterfeit foreign currencies, or money worthless because a foreign 
government or bank of issue had given notice that within a certain period, 
since elapsed, it must be presented to be stamped or exchanged.”83 
“Bucketing” was another fraud practiced on foreign exchange 
customers.  This occurred when currency or foreign bonds were sold for 
cash or on a partial payment plan.  The buyer was “told that his money 
must go to Europe and he is put off on one pretext or another or until the 
dealer is able to buy at a much better price or simply closes his office.”84  
Many of the victims of this practice were unsophisticated, but many banks 
and money brokers located outside the New York foreign exchange market 
were targeted as well.85  The National City Bank also suffered $5 million 
 
 80.  See BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS 17-18 (2015) (describing this 
arbitrage opportunity). 
 81.  The Supreme Court described Ponzi’s scheme as follows: 
In December, 1919, with a capital of $150, he began the business of borrowing 
money on his promissory notes.  He did not profess to receive money for 
investment for account of the lender.  He borrowed the money on his credit 
only.  He spread the false tale that on his own account he was engaged in 
buying international postal coupons in foreign countries and selling them in 
other countries at 100 per cent. profit, and that this was made possible by the 
excessive differences in the rates of exchange following the war.  He was 
willing, he said, to give others the opportunity to share with him this profit.  By 
a written promise in 90 days to pay them $150 for every $100 loaned, he 
induced thousands to lend him.  He stimulated their avidity by paying his 90-
day notes in full at the end of 45 days, and by circulating the notice that he 
would pay any unmatured note presented in less than 45 days at 100 per cent. of 
the loan.  Within eight months he took in $9,582,000, for which he issued his 
notes for $14,374,000.  He paid his agents a commission of 10 per cent.  With 
the 50 per cent. promised to lenders, every loan paid in full with the profit 
would cost him 60 per cent.  He was always insolvent, and became daily more 
so, the more his business succeeded.  He made no investments of any kind, so 
that all the money he had at any time was solely the result of loans by his dupes. 
Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1924). 
 82.  Piratical Practices in Field of Foreign Exchange, supra note 80. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
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loss in Brazil from exchange operations conducted by a rogue trader.86 
The spectacular failure of a foreign exchange firm in 1923 illustrated 
the growth and dangers of the foreign exchange market.  That firm, Knauth, 
Nachod & Kuhne, was a member of the New York Stock Exchange and 
had been in business for seventy years.  Its demise was attributed to the 
depreciation of the German mark.87  That failure was followed by the 
bankruptcy of another New York Stock Exchange member, Zimmerman & 
Forshay, which was dealing in German and other foreign securities.88  The 
German currency was certainly suffering that year.  Reports in August 
1923 indicated that the German mark was trading at the rate of “6,666,666 
marks to the dollar.”89 
Despite these problems, the foreign exchange market in New York 
was recognized as a force in the financial community.  Market commentary 
on foreign currency fluctuations continued to be regularly reported in the 
papers.90  For example, on December 13, 1924, the New York Times noted 
that: 
Activity in the foreign exchanges was greater with a considerable 
increase in speculative dealing, which caused irregular 
movements in a few currencies.  Market opened with sterling and 
most of the smaller continentals lower, and heavy sales of 
sterling, francs and guilders from London during early half of the 
session caused further declines.91 
In 1925, New York amended its Martin Act, a state law that had been 
originally aimed at conventional stock and bond fraud schemes, to cover 
foreign currency orders and options.92  Such legislation was necessary.  At 
about the time of the passage of this amendment to the Martin Act, 
investors gave thousands of dollars to Louis Franko, who was operating in 
New York and offering investments in Italian lire in foreign exchange.  
Franko simply kept the money, but unfortunately for him one of the 
defrauded investors was a former sheriff of Scranton, Pennsylvania, and he 
had Franko arrested.93 
 
 86.  MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 112 (2002). 
 87.  Big Banking Firm, 70 Years in Street, Fails for $12,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
1923, at 1. 
 88.  Old Banking House, Ex-German Agents, Fails for $7,500,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 1923, at 1. 
 89.  Foreign Exchange, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1923, at 4. 
 90.  Stocks Again Up, Led By the Rails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1924, at 8. 
 91.  Foreign Exchange, N.Y.  TIMES, Dec. 13, 1924, at 8. 
 92.  Starts a New War on Stock Swindles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1925, at 6. 
 93.  Seized as Swindler in Foreign Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1926, at 3. 
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D. The Gold Standard and Bretton Woods 
In 1924, there was speculation that Europe would return to a golden 
basis.94  Great Britain returned to the gold standard in 1925,95 and was 
followed by the rest of Europe in the next two years.96  However, gold 
began flowing to the United States from London in 1928 when the Federal 
Reserve Board began raising interest rates.  This disrupted efforts to 
maintain a gold standard with the European nations.97 
The Great Depression led the German Reichsbank to limit foreign 
exchange “to ‘cases of vital necessity’”98 and England to abandon the gold 
standard in 1931.99  America followed in 1933 with the election of Franklin 
Roosevelt.  Roosevelt used his first inaugural address to vilify the “money 
changers,” although that pejorative seemed to have been directed at bankers 
in general.100 In the event, Roosevelt had Congress create an Exchange 
Stabilization Fund that could be used to manipulate the dollar against other 
currencies. That Fund was also used to bail out Mexico in 1995 and to 
guarantee the money market funds during the Financial Crisis in 2008.101 
The Gold Act of 1934 nationalized private gold stocks at an artificially 
low price.102  That action should provide an object lesson to modern 
investors who seek to invest in gold as a hedge against inflation.  Private 
owners of gold were forced by the Gold Act to sell at a price of $20.60 per 
ounce, which was well below the level of $35 per ounce to which it was 
later inflated by Roosevelt.103 
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 repealed the Gold Standard Act of 
1900, which meant that U.S. currency was no longer redeemable in gold.104  
 
 94.  Foreign Exchange, supra note 90, at 8. 
 95.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 291-292. 
 96.  Hetzel, supra note 71, at 12-13 (2002). 
 97.  Id. at 13. See also, LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE 225-235 (2009) 
(describing Britain’s return to the gold standard). 
 98.  EICHENGREEN, supra note 81, at 147. 
 99.  MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 191. 
 100.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14473 [https://perma.cc/3M4T-QVR8]. 
Roosevelt also stated in that address: 
The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our 
civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure 
of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble 
than mere monetary profit. 
Id. 
 101.  BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT 301-302 (2015). 
 102.  MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 191-194. 
 103.  Id. at 191-192. 
 104.  Id. at 193. 
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Congress also declared that private contract provisions for payment in gold 
were void.105  The Silver Purchase Act of 1934 sought additionally to 
inflate silver prices.106  Congress created a $2 billion fund to stabilize 
exchange rates, and the government used that authority in 1935 to stop a 
run on the French franc in 1935.107 
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 resulted in a devaluation of the 
British pound, and the foreign exchange market came to a near standstill 
during the war.108  Once it was clear that the war was won, England and the 
United States led the effort to create a stable monetary system through the 
so-called Bretton Woods agreement.109  This arrangement pegged currency 
prices of participating nations to the dollar, which in turn was pegged to 
gold at a price of $35 per ounce.110 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), created to act as a lender to 
countries that needed funding to maintain the stability of their currencies,111 
had to deal with various post-war economic crises that involved, among 
others, the massive devaluation of the British pound in 1949.112  There were 
other problems that eventually led to the abandonment of the Bretton 
Woods currency stabilization structure.  Beginning late in the 1950s, gold 
began to leave the United States in “the American gold crisis . . . in great 
part the result of American expenditures for European recovery and 
defense.”113  Those trade imbalances and then inflation led to an attack on 
the dollar in which U.S. currency was exchanged for gold at the U.S. 
 
 105.  Id. at 191-192. The government built the gold depository at Fort Knox, Kentucky 
to hold the gold stocks purchased under this program. Id. at 195. 
 106.  Id. at p. 194-195. 
 107.  Id. at p. 193-194. 
 108.  See EINZIG, supra note 10, at 227 (“During the second World War stability of 
exchange rates was maintained in most countries through a complete suspension of dealings 
and the adoption of advanced exchange control.”). 
 109.  BERNSTEIN, supra 41, at 331. As one author has noted: 
The plans for a new international economic system were worked out by 730 
delegates from 44 countries who gathered in the White Mountain resort of 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. Most of the final design came from 
John Maynard Keynes, representing the British Treasury, and his counterpart, 
Harry White of the US Treasury Department. 
Id.  John Maynard Keynes had been among those speculating in the foreign exchange 
market after World War I. 2 ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIST 
AS SAVIOUR, 1920-1937, at 41 (1992). 
 110.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 332.  
 111.  MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 276. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR. A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE 
HOUSE 653 (2002). 
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Treasury, sharply depleting America’s gold stocks.114  U.S. gold stocks 
dropped from $22 billion to $17 billion between 1958 and 1960.115  
President John F. Kennedy prohibited Americans from holding gold abroad 
and sought to limit foreign investments by Americans.116  Those and other 
efforts were unsuccessful.  Several efforts were also made to maintain gold 
at $35 per ounce, including the formation of a gold pool by eight European 
countries in 1960 that sought to support the dollar.117 
“[B]y 1955, current account convertibility was largely established de 
facto; at the end of 1958 it was publicly announced. . . . [C]onvertibility 
was the final stage of liberalization, which ensured that consumers could 
achieve the maximum satisfaction . . . by being able to trade at world 
prices.”118  Commercial firms engaged in international business and 
wealthy individuals began maintaining working balances in foreign 
currencies to meet operational needs and to satisfy their “speculative 
instincts.”119  Speculators began trading in foreign currencies and gold in 
anticipation of devaluations.  In 1960, speculators were buying and selling 
gold at $40 per ounce, while the U.S. was selling it for $35 per ounce.120 
In 1963, Fortune magazine noted that individuals had become 
interested in hedging and speculating on the devaluation of the dollar.  The 
article also noted that banks were “apt to acquiesce readily enough when 
one of their important customers indicates firmly that he wants to speculate 
in foreign exchange.”121  At that time foreign exchange contracts traded in 
this so-called “interbank market” were “similar to the standard commodity-
futures contract,” which did not include any intent of making or taking 
delivery of the underlying foreign currency that was being exchanged.122  
Small speculators did not have access to the interbank currency market but 
sometimes used their stockbrokers as intermediaries with the large banks.123 
By 1968, American gold stocks were down to $12.4 billion and 
 
 114.  MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 326. 
 115.  3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE 
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 1970-2001, at 36 (2002). 
 116.  SCHLESINGER JR., supra note 114, at 510. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  C. Fred Bergsten & John Williamson, Currency Convertibility in Eastern Europe, 
43 Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1990), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/1990/S90BERGS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NC6Q-HXSL] (last visited Mar. 3 2016). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 326. 
 121.  Daniel Seligman, T.A. Wise & Carol J, Loomis, Personal Investing, FORTUNE, Feb. 
1963, at 201. 
 122.  Id. at 202. 
 123.  Id. at 201. 
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falling.124  The run on gold was not halted until August 15, 1971, when 
President Richard M. Nixon took America off the gold standard.  The 
president closed the gold window and announced that the U.S. would no 
longer honor the Bretton Woods pledge to peg the price of gold at $35 per 
ounce.125  This action was called the “Nixon shock” and within a few years 
the dollar was floating against other currencies at exchange rates set by the 
market.126 
Governments, nevertheless, periodically intervened to manipulate 
their currencies.  For example, in the 1980s, the dollar appreciated sharply 
against other currencies, which hurt U.S. exports.  This led to the so-called 
“Plaza Accord” in 1985; that agreement was entered into by the U.S., 
Japan, West Germany, France and England after the dollar had depreciated 
by almost 50 percent.127 
Another example of government intervention was the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) that was created in 1979 by members of the European 
Community, predecessor to the European Union.  The ERM was a joint 
effort by European Community countries to stabilize their currency 
exchange rates against each other, while floating against other currencies.  
This was a precursor to the introduction of the euro in 1999,128 which 
sought to eliminate currency risk in transactions occurring among 
businesses in the European Union.129  The ERM was not entirely 
successful.  England was forced from that arrangement after speculators 
attacked its currency in 1992.  Those speculators “borrowed UK gilts only 
to sell them and buy them back later at cheaper prices.  They repeated the 
trick every few minutes, making a profit each time.”130  One of those 
speculators, George Soros’ Quantum Fund, made an estimated 1 billion 
pounds from such trading.131 
 
 124.  MARKHAM, supra note 116, at 36-37. 
 125.  Id. at 38. 
 126.  Id. at 38-39. 
 127.  THOLOOR M. THOMAS, BULL RUN 11 (2013). 





qsNw&sig2=okjGd8ZwVr0wgkk-gldqRg [https://perma.cc/BZC5-H6H7] (last visited Apr. 
26, 2015). 
 129.  EICHENGREEN, supra note 81, at 71. 
 130.  Philip Inman, Black Wednesday 20 Years On: How the Day Unfolded, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/black-
wednesday-20-years-pound-erm [https://perma.cc/2D6L-SG36]. 
 131.  Id. 
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Governments continue to intervene in the currency markets.132  “In the 
modern era, a country trying to manage its exchange rates typically buys or 
sells its currency in the market, or uses capital controls or other regulations 
to restrict its use. Such practices are still common among emerging 
markets, notably China.”133  Most recently, Greece’s economic problems 
have threatened its ability to stay in the euro zone and the European Central 
Bank intervened to prop up banks in that country.134 
II. REGULATION OF THE INTERBANK CURRENCY MARKET 
A. Growth of the Market  
Prior to the Nixon shock, an interbank foreign exchange market was 
operating, “but it was an exclusive club that operated in the shadows of 
international high finance.”135  The banks trading in this market bought and 
sold currencies off the official exchange rates “at slight fluctuations among 
themselves or for their big commercial customers, locking the public out of 
the market.”136  However, within a few years after the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, the banks developed a more sophisticated interbank 
foreign exchange market. 
Many of the larger banks created separate divisions or foreign 
exchange departments staffed with personnel that specialized in making 
markets in currencies.  Those banks executed transactions for large multi-
 
 132.  For example, the European Union created an ERM II in 1999, which sought to 
“ensure that exchange rate fluctuations between the euro and other EU currencies do not 
disrupt economic stability within the single market, and to help non euro-area countries 
prepare themselves for participation in the euro area.” What is ERM II?, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
(July 23, 2014),  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/erm2/index_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GQJ5-Y67B]. 
 133.  Greg Ip, Currencies Gyrate, But There’s No War, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/currencies- gyrate- but- theres- no- war- 1426094448 
[https://perma.cc/T24L-GKFR]. In 2015, the U.S. entered into a pact with several Pacific 
Rim countries that sought to deter currency manipulations done for the purpose of 
benefitting trade. 12 Pacific Rim Countries Sign Pact to End Currency Manipulation, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.in/12-pacific-rim-countries-sign-pact-
end-currency-manipulation-653611 [https://perma.cc/9XAF-GVY8]. 
 134.  Spiegel & Jones, supra note 133. The Chinese government devalued its currency, 
the yuan, sharply beginning on August 10, 2015, which makes imports into that country 
more expensive and exports cheaper. This raised concerns over trade wars. Lingling Wei, 
China Moves to Devalue Yuan, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-moves-to-devalue-the-yuan-1439258401 
[https://perma.cc/6DT3-TGZ2]. 
 135.  LEO MELAMED, ESCAPE TO THE FUTURES 170 (1996). 
 136.  Id. 
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national corporations, other banks and speculators.137  This market grew 
rapidly because “[f]oreign-exchange dealings no longer concerned just the 
multinational companies, the biggest banks, and the wealthiest individuals. 
Anybody doing business handling money on an international basis is 
affected.”138  Individuals and companies sought to protect their assets, and 
speculators sought a profit.139 
A sophisticated payment system developed to facilitate transactions in 
the interbank foreign exchange market.  The Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS) was created just before the Nixon shock to act 
as “an electronic payments system that transfers funds and settles 
transactions in U.S. dollars.  CHIPS enables banks to transfer and settle 
international payments more quickly by replacing official bank checks with 
electronic bookkeeping entries.”140  “Historically, CHIPS specialized in 
settling the dollar portion of foreign exchange transactions, and CHIPS 
estimates that it now handles 95 percent of all U.S. dollar payments moving 
between countries.”141  CHIPS also played an important role in an event 
that led to the regulation of the interbank foreign exchange market. 
B. Creation of the Basel Committee 
“After the collapse of Bretton Woods, many banks incurred large 
 
 137.  Stewart L. Brown & Dekle Day, Federal Regulation of Foreign Currency Trading 
for Future Delivery on Interbank and Futures Markets, 9 FLA. ST. U.  L. REV. 69, 71-72 
(1981). 
 138.  Everybody Plays the Currency Game, BUS. WEEK, May 4, 1974, at 34. As another 
source noted: 
[F]loating exchange rates permanently destabilized global commerce, creating 
artificial advantages and real losses almost at random. Currency values were 
pushed back and forth in unpredictable ways that no business executive could 
reasonably foresee. Every multinational corporation became, perforce, a 
gambler in currency markets. 
WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 339 (1987). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  CHIPS, N.Y. FED. RESERVE BANK (Apr. 2002), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed36.html [https://perma.cc/WE4A-
8XFY]. As described by one court: 
The New York Clearing House Association (“Clearing House”) maintains 
computer facilities and implements techniques for the transfer of funds among 
its member banks. In June, 1974 the Clearing House was using the Clearing 
House Interbank Payments System (“CHIPS”), a computerized interbank 
system for the transfer of funds involving international customers of Clearing 
House member banks. 
Delbrueck & Co. v. Mfr. Hanover Trust Co., 464 F. Supp. 989, 992 (S.D. N.Y. 1979). 
 141.  CHIPS, supra note 142. 
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foreign currency losses.”142  One of the more spectacular of those losses 
occurred at the Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany on June 28, 1974.  Its 
failure from some $200 million in foreign currency exchange losses 
touched off an international banking crisis.143  Because of time differences, 
U.S. banks had made their daily payments through CHIPS to Bankhaus 
Herstatt but had not received their exchange payments from that bank 
before its failure, which meant that they would only have a claim in 
bankruptcy for their reciprocal payments.  This time gap between 
settlement payments became known as the “Herstatt risk;” banks using the 
CHIPS payment system then refused, for a time, to make further payments 
through that system for fear that they would not receive reciprocal payment 
should a counterparty bank fail.144  The failure of the Franklin National 
Bank in the U.S. at about the same time as the Herstatt debacle raised 
further concerns over foreign exchange transactions.  At that time, the 
Franklin National Bank was the largest bank failure in U.S. history.  Its 
collapse was due in large measure to $47 million in losses from foreign 
exchange trading.145 
The failure of Franklin National and Bankhaus Herstatt led to an 
international effort to regulate the interbank foreign currency market.146  
This regulation was coordinated through the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee) that was created by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in 1974.147  The Basel Committee “has its 
origins in the financial market turmoil that followed the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates in 1973.”148 
“In response to these and other disruptions in the international 
financial markets, the central bank governors of the G10 [Group of Ten] 
countries established a Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices at the end of 1974”149 which was later renamed the 
 
 142.  A Brief History of the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6DK-C924] (last visited Apr. 21, 
2015). 
 143.  The failure of “a small German bank sent shock waves through the system, costing 
banks from New York to Singapore some $620 million in losses.” Gergana Koleva, ‘Icon of 
Systemic Risk’ Haunts Industry Decades After Demise, AM. BANKER (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/bankhaus-herstatt-icon-of-systemic-risk-
1039312-1.html [https://perma.cc/LJS9-LU3H]. 
 144.  MARKHAM, supra note 116, at 20. 
 145.  Id. at 19-20. 
 146.  Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards under 
the Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69694, 69703 (Nov. 20, 2012). 
 147.  BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 144. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
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“Basel Committee on Banking Supervision . . . .”150  The Basel Committee 
created a supervising agreement called the “‘Concordant’”151 that set 
supervisory procedures for international banks.  “The Concordat set out 
principles for sharing supervisory responsibility for banks’ foreign 
branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures between host and parent (or home) 
supervisory authorities.”152 
C. Settlement Risks 
In 1980, the G10 countries created a “Group of Experts on Payment 
Systems.”153  This group conducted a review of the payment systems in the 
G10 countries and published its findings in 1983 in what were called “Red 
Books.”154  Those Red Books provided a comprehensive description of the 
payment, clearing and settlement systems of numerous countries.155  In 
1989, the G10 countries created a Committee on Interbank Netting 
Schemes (CINS).  That committee published a report in 1990 that set forth 
“minimum standards for the operation of bilateral and multilateral cross-
border and multicurrency netting schemes and sets out the G10 central 
banks’ framework for the cooperative oversight of such systems.”156  In 
1990, the G10 countries created the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems, which was later renamed the Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures (CPMI).157  This permanent committee oversees 
international payment systems.  It is also a member of the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), the successor to the Financial Stability Forum.  The 
Group of Twenty countries gave the FSB an expanded role after the 
 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. This did not stop problems in the foreign exchange market. In 1975, a 
whistleblower at Citibank claimed that a senior currency trader was taking kickbacks and 
that the bank was parking profits from currency trading in the Bahamas in order to evade 
U.S. taxes. Eric Dash, Edwin Edwards, 62, Figure in Citibank Currency Case, Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/29/business/29EDWARDS.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/QQ57-BAC6] (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). At the time, Citibank was 
conducting about ten percent of the world’s foreign exchange transactions, and by 1978 the 
bank was earning over $100 million from that trading. PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, WRISTON 605 
(1995). The whistleblower’s allegations resulted in eight years of investigations by Congress 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission but no wrongdoing was ever charged. See 
MARKHAM, supra note 116, at 65 (describing these events). 
 153.  About the CPMI, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/info.htm?m=3%7C16%7C2 [https://perma.cc/6S9E-ETUJ]. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. The membership in this committee later expanded to twenty-five countries. Id. 
 157.  Id. 
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Financial Crisis of 2008.  It is now broadly tasked with coordinating and 
promoting more effective regulatory and supervisory policies in the entire 
financial sector.158 
U.S. regulators were also focusing on foreign exchange operations by 
banks.  A 1989 Banking Circular issued by the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC) advised the banks it regulated that they must make 
periodic risk assessments of their international payment systems.  This 
Circular also noted that international payment systems posed risks in 
various forms, including operational reliability, liquidity and the credit 
quality of counterparties.159 
Still, problems surfaced periodically in the interbank foreign currency 
market.  The failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 caused concern 
with the foreign exchange operations of a London affiliate of that broker-
dealer.160  The Bank of England intervened and created a facility for the 
settlement of that affiliate’s foreign exchange transactions.  The Bank of 
England essentially acted as an escrow agent to ensure that the parties on 
both sides of those trades would be paid.161  The failure of the BCCI SA 
bank in 1991 caused losses to foreign exchange counterparties.  A London 
foreign exchange counterparty lost a large sum because of a delay in a 
settlement payment from BCCI due to a U.S. holiday.  The London 
counterparty paid, but during the delay, BCCI failed and its counter 
payment was canceled.  A large Japanese bank also suffered losses because 
it paid on a foreign exchange transaction with a BCCI affiliate but did not 
receive a counter payment before BCCI failed, which caused its accounts to 
be frozen.162 
Political problems in the Soviet Union caused further disruptions in 
1991.  An attempted coup d’état created uncertainty as to the ability of 
some Soviet Union financial institutions to perform on their foreign 
exchange contracts.  This disruption was only temporary, however, because 
the counterparties were able, with some assistance from government 
authorities, to reach a resolution with the Soviet institutions.163  The 
bankruptcy of Baring Brothers in 1995 also temporarily disrupted foreign 
 
 158.  Our History, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2016), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/R8VT-DPNM]. 
 159.  COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, BANKING 
ISSUANCE (1989). 
 160.  Gabriele Galati, Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Markets and CLS Bank, BIS 
QUARTERLY REVIEW, Dec. 2002, at 56. 
 161.  COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF 
THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE OPERATIONS 6 
(1996). 
 162.  Id. at 7. 
 163.  Id. at 7-8. 
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currency settlements in Europe.164 
In order to reduce the foreign exchange settlement risks that leave a 
counterparty exposed to the risk of the failure of its opposing party, a group 
of large banks formed the CLS Bank International in 2002.165  The CLS 
Bank seeks to reduce this so-called “Herstatt risk” by requiring 
simultaneous settlement payments by each party to a foreign exchange 
transaction, i.e., delivery-versus-payment.166 
Bank regulators continued to strengthen the supervision of foreign 
exchange operations.  In September 2000, the Basel Committee provided 
supervisory guidance for managing settlement risk in foreign exchange 
operations.167  It noted that settlement risks from foreign currency exchange 
involved “daily exposures of tens of billions of dollars for the largest 
banks.  Most significantly, for banks of any size, the amount at risk to even 
a single counterparty could in some cases exceed their capital.”168  Among 
other things, this report noted that supervision of settlement risks should be 
carried out by the highest levels of bank management with supervision 
from the bank’s board of directors.169 
Despite the creation of the CLS Bank, settlement risk remained.  A 
2008 report by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems found 
that 32 percent of foreign exchange transactions surveyed by the committee 
were done outside the CLS Bank.  These settlements were done through 
traditional correspondent banking relationships, and half of those 
 
 164.  Id. at 8. 
 165.  About Us, CLS (2015), http://www.cls-group.com/About/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/KC2T-2J8U]. 
As the CLS Bank noted: 
All members of the FX community potentially bear the risk of loss of principal due to 
settlement risk. Settlement risk, also known as “Herstatt risk,” is widely recognized as the 
most significant systemic risk to participants in the FX market, meaning the mitigation of it 
is a high priority for the community as a whole. 
Settlement Risk, CLS (2015), http://www.cls-group.com/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/EB87-6EXE]. 
 166.  See Galati, supra note 162, at 56-64 (describing the settlement process that arose 
through the CLS after the closure of Bankhaus Herstatt). 
169 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR 
MANAGING SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 1 (2000) (explaining 
the purpose of its 2000 report as providing information about settlement risk and 
management). 
 167.  See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR 
MANAGING SETTLEMENT RISK IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 1 (2000) (explaining 
the purpose of its 2000 report as providing information about settlement risk and 
management). 
 168.  Id. at 1. 
 169.  Id. at 3. 
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settlements were found to have overnight risk exposure.170  Several 
recommendations were made by the committee to reduce that exposure, 
including greater use of bilateral netting arrangements that would reduce 
gross exposures.171 
Still more guidance was provided by the Basel Committee in 2012 for 
managing risks associated with settlement of foreign exchange 
settlements.172  Those risks were identified as “principal risk, replacement 
cost risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and legal risk.”173  A principal 
recommendation was the reduction of settlement risks by delivery-versus-
payment systems.174  Concerns remained with respect to settlement.  In 
2013, the New York Federal Reserve Bank demanded that banks provide 
better management of foreign currency exchange risks.175 
With all this supervision, no one was able to anticipate the surprise 
decision of the Swiss government to decouple its currency from the euro in 
January 2015.  The result was that the Swiss franc increased in value by 
nearly forty percent in one day, causing some crippling losses.  Everest 
Capital Global, a hedge fund, lost a reported $830 million in a single day 
after the Swiss franc was decoupled.176  Another large hedge fund, 
COMAC, shut down its operations after experiencing large losses from the 
Swiss franc.177  FXCM Inc., a U.S. based retail foreign exchange broker, 
had to obtain $300 million from an investment firm in order to cover its 
losses.178  Citigroup shut down a foreign exchange trading program for 
 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 2. 
 172.  BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR 
MANAGING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
TRANSACTIONS 3-4 (2012). 
 173.  Id. at 3. 
 174.  Id. This guidance was updated in 2013. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR MANAGING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 3-5 (2013) (providing the 2013 
updates). 
 175.  Managing Foreign Exchange Risk, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD BANK OF NEW YORK,  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/financial-market-
infrastructure-and-reform/managing-foreign-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/9XVZ-RPHK]. 
 176.  Katherine Burton, Swiss Franc Trade Said to Wipe Out Everest’s Main Fund, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 18, 2015, 7:02 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-17/swiss-franc-trade-is-said-to-wipe-out-
everest-s-main-fund [https://perma.cc/6SGV-QAT2]. 
 177.  Brian Portnoy, Hedge Funds and the ‘Swiss Miss’, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:36 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianportnoy/2015/01/23/hedge-funds-and-the-swiss-
miss/ [https://perma.cc/3NQU-FQ9W]. 
 178.  Ira Iosebashvili, et al., Surge of Swiss Franc Triggers Hundreds of Millions in 
Losses, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swiss-franc-
move-cripples-currency-brokers-1421371654 [https://perma.cc/SF5Y-TFWK]. 
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wealthy clients who sustained large losses from the franc revaluation.179  
Deutsche Bank lost about $150 million during this event, and Barclays had 
large losses.180 
D. Swap and Other OTC Instruments in the Interbank Market 
The interbank exchange market encompasses a broad range of trading 
in cash currency, swaps, options and other derivatives.181  The Dodd-Frank 
Act that was passed in 2010 required central clearing for most swaps and 
other OTC derivative instruments.  Regulators were directed to set margin 
requirements for any remaining uncleared OTC swaps or other OTC 
derivatives.  Capital and margin requirements for uncleared swaps 
(including initial and variation margin) for banks were to be set by the 
appropriate prudential bank regulator, while the CFTC was given that role 
for other entities.182 
The Basel Committee worked with the board of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to formulate 
requirements for centralized clearing for standardized swaps and margin 
requirements for uncleared swaps and other OTC derivatives in which 
banks participate as principal.183  However, Dodd-Frank allowed the 
Secretary of the Treasury to exempt foreign exchange swaps and forwards 
from the definition of “swap” for most Dodd-Frank purposes, including 
margin and central clearing requirements.184  The Treasury Secretary made 
that determination on November 20, 2012.185  After examining the risks 
presented by foreign exchange transactions in the interbank currency 
market, the Secretary concluded that the market was already subject to 
extensive and coordinated oversight by the largest central bank regulators. 
 
 179.  Chiara Albanese & Peter Rudegeair, Citigroup Closes Exclusive Credit Program 
Following Swiss Franc Losses, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2015, 6:24 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-closes-exclusive-credit-program-following-swiss-
franc-losses-1431599055 [https://perma.cc/P7XE-M749]. 
 180.  Iosebashvili, supra note 180. 
 181.  See generally, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, TURNOVER SURVEY 2 (2010) (describing 
instruments traded in the interbank currency market). 
 182.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 731(e)(1)(A) 
(2010) (“Each registered swap dealer and major swap participant for which there is a 
prudential regulator shall meet such minimum capital requirements and minimum initial and 
variation margin requirements as the prudential regulator shall by rule or regulation 
prescribe . . . .”). 
 183.  BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-
CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 1 (2012). 
 184.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 721 (2010) 
(defining “swaps” and “foreign exchange swaps”). 
 185.  Dept. of the Treasury, supra note 148, at 69, 694. 
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The Secretary specifically cited the operations of the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems as providing the needed regulation.  The 
Secretary also noted that the CLS Bank and the development of delivery- 
versus - payment arrangements had reduced settlement risks.  As a further 
protection, the Federal Reserve Board regularly conducts reviews of the 
foreign exchange operations of large banks to measure the depth of their 
risk assessment programs and operational procedures.  That information is 
then shared with the Basel Committee for international coordination.  The 
Secretary believed that this process negated the need for a central clearing 
and trading mandate for the interbank currency market.186 
E. Fraud and Price Fixing in the Foreign Exchange Interbank Market 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, several large banks became involved in high profile 
scandals involving their manipulation of foreign exchange rates and 
defrauding of institutional customers.  The market they were accused of 
manipulating—the commercial interbank foreign exchange market—was 
described as follows: 
Currencies are traded in pairs where the seller sells one currency 
and buys another, and the price of one currency is expressed in 
relation to another currency as a ratio.  To initiate an FX 
transaction, typically, a customer contacts a dealer bank for a 
quote for the relevant currency and quantity.  The dealer provides 
a “bid,” which is the price at which the dealer is willing to buy 
the currency.  The dealer also quotes an “ask,” the price at which 
the dealer is willing to sell the currency.  The difference between 
the bid and ask is called the “bid-ask spread,” which is the basis 
of the dealer’s compensation.  While “dealers are incentivized to 
quote wider bid-ask spreads,” competition among them “narrows 
bid-ask spreads.”  Currencies are commonly traded at published 
exchange rates called “fixing rates.”  The WM/Reuters published 
rates “are the most important fixing rates in the FX markets” and 
“the primary benchmark for currency trading globally.” . . . 
 
For the most widely traded currencies, the Fix is determined by 
the median price of actual FX transactions in the 30 seconds 
before and after 4 p.m. London time (the “Fixing Window”).  
The WM Company extracts actual market prices from electronic 
communications networks that Defendants use to execute orders 
 
 186.  Id. at 69, 698. 
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for FX instruments, such as Reuters, Currenex and EBS.  The 
process is automated and anonymous. Trading at the Fix is 
popular for many reasons, including reduced tracking error and 
the perception of “universality and independence from any 
specific dealer.”187 
The Justice Department has further described this interbank foreign 
exchange market as follows: 
The FX Spot Market is an over-the-counter market and, as such, 
is decentralized and requires financial institutions to act as 
dealers willing to buy or sell a currency. Dealers, also known 
throughout the FX Spot Market as market makers, therefore play 
a critical role in ensuring the continued functioning of the 
market. . . . 
 
A dealer in the FX Spot Market quotes prices at which the dealer 
stands ready to buy or sell the currency. These price quotes are 
expressed as units of a given currency, known as the “counter” 
currency, which would be required to purchase one unit of a 
“base” currency, which is often the U.S. dollar and so reflects an 
“exchange rate” between the currencies. Dealers generally 
provide price quotes to four decimal points, with the final digit 
known as a “percentage in point” or “pip.” A dealer may provide 
price quotes to potential customers in the form of a “bid/ask 
spread,” which represents the difference between the price at 
which the dealer is willing to buy the currency from the customer 
(the “bid”) and the price at which the dealer is willing to sell the 
currency to the customer (the “ask”). A dealer may quote a 
spread, or may provide just the bid to a potential customer 
inquiring about selling currency or just the ask to a potential 
customer inquiring about buying currency. 
 
. . . A customer wishing to trade currency may transact with a 
dealer by placing an order through the dealer’s internal, 
proprietary electronic trading platform or by contacting the 
dealer’s salesperson to obtain a quote. When a customer accepts a 
dealer’s quote, that dealer now bears the risk for any change in 
the currency’s price that may occur before the dealer is able to 
trade with other dealers in the “interdealer market” to fill the 
order by buying the currency the dealer has agreed to sell to the 
customer, or by selling the currency the dealer has agreed to buy 
from the customer. A dealer may also take and execute orders 
 
 187.  In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litigation, 74 F.Supp.3d 581, 
586-87 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2015). 
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from customers such as “fix orders,” which are orders to trade at 
a subsequently determined “fix rate.” When a dealer accepts a fix 
order from a customer, the dealer agrees to fill the order at a rate 
to be determined at a subsequent fix time based on trading in the 
interdealer market. Two such “fixes” used to determine a fix rate 
are the European Central Bank fix, which occurs each trading day 
at 2:15 PM (CET) and the World Markets/Reuters fix, which 
occurs each trading day at 4:00 PM (GMT).188 
Before the recent scandals, fraud and manipulation had been rare in 
the foreign exchange interbank market, at least in comparison to other 
financial markets.  Nevertheless, there had been some problems.  For 
example, the SEC settled a case brought against a former portfolio and 
currency manager for Merrill Lynch, who was charged with fraud in 
foreign exchange transactions that occurred between 1997 and 2001.189  
The defendant allegedly executed foreign customer orders but delayed their 
allocation.  If the trade turned out profitable at the close of the London 
market, the defendant would allocate the trade to the accounts of his 
favored customers, even though they had not entered the order.  The 
disfavored customers received less favorable prices.190 
In another instance, the European Commission (EC) fined five 
German banks about $90 million for fixing their currency conversion 
commissions at about three percent during the transition to the euro starting 
in January 1999.191  A large number of other banks and bureau de change 
across the eurozone were the target of cartel proceedings by the EC for 
similar conduct.  Those proceedings were discontinued after the parties 
agreed to reduce their commissions significantly.192 
In 2002, John Rusnak, a rogue trader in the Baltimore, Maryland 
office of an affiliate of Allied Irish Banks, lost $750 million as the result of 
unauthorized trades in foreign exchange.  Later, Allied Irish Banks came 
under investigation by Irish authorities over whether it had been over-
charging foreign exchange customers in currency conversions.193 
 
 188.  Plea Agreement at 4-5, United States v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., (2015). 
 189.  See Gobora, SEC Litigation Release No. 17555 (June 11, 2002), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17555.htm [https://perma.cc/6BYB-ZRGP] 
(summarizing the action taken by the SEC in SEC v. Gobora). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  EC Competition Committee, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments 
in European Commission, 10 (2001), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2001_annual_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VXB3-3TW3].  
 192.  Id. at 11-12. 
 193.  Helena Keers, AIB Admits Overcharging, THE TELEGRAPH (May 7, 2004), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2884790/AIB-admits-overcharging.html  
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In 2003, forty-seven foreign currency traders were charged with 
criminal fraud by the U.S. attorney in New York through a sting operation 
called operation “Wooden Nickel.”  Among other things, the government 
charged that the defendants had defrauded large banks through trades 
rigged by bank employees to assure profits to non-bank traders, who then 
kicked back part of the profits to the bank employees.194  The banks that 
were victimized by this conduct included JPMorgan Chase, UBS, and 
Société Générale.195 
The National Australian Bank, that country’s largest bank and second 
largest company, suffered a loss of $458 million from the unauthorized 
foreign exchange trading of a rogue employee in 2004.196  As a result of 
that loss, the bank’s management was restructured and several employees 
were forced to resign, including its CEO and chairman.197 
2. The Post Financial Crisis Foreign Currency Scandals 
After the Financial Crisis of 2008, several large banks were the targets 
of regulators for their banking practices in a successive series of cases that 
settled for billions of dollars. The first wave of these scandals involved 
abusive mortgage practices.  By October 2014, it was estimated that the six 
largest U.S. banks had paid $143.2 billion to regulators to settle mortgage 
related claims.198  In a second wave of cases, many of the same banks were 
 
[https://perma.cc/C4UA-TXS2]. 
 194.  JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE 
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 490 (2006).  Kenneth N. Gilpin, 47 Currency Traders 
Are Indicted on Fraud Charges, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/business/19CND-DOLL.html [https://perma.cc/7C3C-
6AP3]. 
 195.  MARKHAM, supra note 193, at 490. 
 196.  Id. at 496. 
 197.  Heads Roll at NAB Over Foreign Exchange Scandal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/12/1078594547046.html 
[https://perma.cc/7JTJ-EEAU]. 
 198.  Lynnley Browning, Too Big to Tax: Settlements Are Tax Write-offs for Banks, 
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/giant-penalties-are-
giant-tax-write-offs-wall-street-279993.html [https://perma.cc/K7XD-TSDX].  Bank of 
America alone has paid some $90 billion to settle government and private claims over 
lending practices by the bank and its affiliates. John Maxfield, The Complete List: Bank of 
America’s Legal Fines and Settlements Since 2008, THE MOTLEY FOOL, (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:59 
AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/10/01/the-complete-list-bank-of-
americas-legal-fines-and.aspx [https://perma.cc/62XG-NMWD].  JPMorgan Chase 
contributed $26 billion to that total. Emily Glazer & Patrick Fitzgerald, J.P. Morgan Wins 
Legal Battle in WaMu Case, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-
morgan-wins-legal-battle-in-washington-mutual-case-1433365003 [https://perma.cc/MV74-
JAXS]. 
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charged with manipulating LIBOR and other interest rate benchmarks.  The 
settlements with regulators in those cases totaled some $9 billion.199  A 
third wave of scandals followed by investigations into whether some of 
those same large banks had been manipulating foreign exchange rates and 
defrauding their institutional clients in foreign exchange transactions.  The 
government then brought cases against several of those banks, which were 
settled in amounts totaling some $10 billion.200  The following is a 
description of those foreign exchange related actions. 
3. The J.P. Morgan et al.  First Settlement 
In November 2014, six banks agreed to pay $4.3 billion to settle 
claims that they had manipulated the WM/Reuters benchmark currency rate 
and improperly shared information about customer orders.  The charges in 
those actions included a claim that: 
Traders at different Banks formed tight knit groups in which 
information was shared about client activity, including using 
code names to identify clients without naming them. These 
groups were described as, for example, “the players”, “the 3 




 199.  Jeffrey Vogelli & Hugo Miller, Deutsche Bank Libor Damage Goes Beyond 
Record $2.5 Billion Fine, BLOOMBERG BUS. (April 23, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/deutsche-bank-libor-damage-goes-
beyond-record-2-5-billion-fine [https://perma.cc/AK37-3PBF].  Two London based traders 
were convicted in New York on charges they manipulated LIBOR rates. Christopher M. 
Matthews, Jury Delivers First U.S. Libor Manipulation Convictions, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-jury-convicts-former-rabobank-traders-in-
libor-trial-1446742694 [https://perma.cc/4FG5-9QVK]. A trader in London was found 
guilty of manipulating Libor rates by an English jury, but six other traders were found not 
guilty of such charges in a separate trial. Chad Bray, Sixth Ex-Broker Cleared in London 
Libor Trial, N. Y. TIMES, (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/business/dealbook/sixth-ex-broker-cleared-in-london-
libor-trial.html [https://perma.cc/T2XC-2E7U]. 
 200.  See, e.g., Chiara Albanese, David Enrich & Katie Martin, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan 
Take Brunt of Currencies Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-reach-settlement-in-foreign-exchange-rigging-probe-
1415772504 [https://perma.cc/SY5E-HJ8F] (summarizing some of the relative fines doled 
out by various U.S. regulators to each of the major banks); see also, Michael Corkery & Ben 
Protess, 5 Big Banks to Pay Billions and Plead Guilty in Currency and Interest Rate Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015),  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-
banks-to-pay-billions-and-plead-guilty-in-currency-and-interest-rate-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/4TTU-ALH6] (describing more settlements between banks and 
regulators). 
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Traders shared the information obtained through these groups to 
help them work out their trading strategies.  They then attempted 
to manipulate fix rates and trigger client “stop loss” orders 
(which are designed to limit the losses a client could face if 
exposed to adverse currency rate movements).  This involved 
traders attempting to manipulate the relevant currency rate in the 
market, for example, to ensure that the rate at which the bank had 
agreed to sell a particular currency to its clients was higher than 
the average rate it had bought that currency for in the market.  If 
successful, the bank would profit.201 
This settlement was reached with a host of regulators including the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in London, the CFTC, the OCC and 
the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority.  The settling banks 
were Citigroup, JPMorgan, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC and Bank 
of America.  Citigroup and JPMorgan each paid about $1 billion in that 
settlement.202  The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority also 
 
 201.  Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Fines Five Banks £1.1 Billion for 
FX Failings and Announces Industry-Wide Remediation Program, (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fx-failings [https://perma.cc/5WU7-
RAA6]. 
 202.  Suzi Ring & Liam Vaughan, Citigroup, JP Morgan Pay Most in $4.3 Billion FX 
Rig Cases, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-12/banks-to-pay-3-3-billion-in-fx-
manipulation-probe [https://perma.cc/X7A8-ESR7]. The CFTC described the process for 
fixing currency benchmarks as follows: 
The WM/R Rates, one of the leading and most widely referenced FX 
benchmark rates, are calculated multiple times daily, including at 4 p.m. 
London time, which is commonly referred to as the “4 p.m. fix.” For twenty-one 
of the most liquid currencies (the “trade currencies”), the 4 p.m. fix is based on 
actual trades, using bids and offers extracted from a certain electronic trading 
system during a one minute window (“fix period”). WM/Reuters determines the 
bid and offer rates based on the captured transacted rate and the bid-offer 
spread. WM/Reuters then calculates the median of these bid and offer rates and 
from these medians determines a “mid trade rate.” If there are not enough 
trades, WM/Reuters calculates a “mid order rate.” All orders and transactions 
are weighted equally, regardless of their notional sizes. 
  
The WM/R Rates for the other 139 less liquid currencies (the “non-trade 
currencies”) are set by similar methodology.  Because these currencies are less 
liquid, WM/Reuters relies on indicative quotes (submissions) derived from a 
Reuters computer feed that solicits “indications of interest” from market 
participants as part of its fixing methodology.  WM/Reuters captures 
independent snapshots of indicative quotes for bids and offers, and selects the 
median rate from these quotes as the 4 p.m. WM/R fix. 
  
WM/Reuters also provides fix rates for forward and non-deliverable forward 
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required UBS to limit the compensation of its foreign exchange traders.  
UBS was also required to automate at least nine percent of its foreign 
currency exchange trading and to more effectively manage conflicts of 
interest through the separation of customer and proprietary trading.203 
Barclays dropped out of the settlement talks concerning its actions in 
the foreign currency market.  However, the bank set aside $1.8 billion to 
cover potential fines from its foreign exchange trading and, as described 
below, did later settle regulatory actions over its foreign exchange trading 
activities.204 
4. The JPMorgan et al.  Second Settlement 
The Justice Department conducted a separate investigation of the 
foreign exchange operations of the usual suspects, i.e., the large banks.  A 
settlement of those claims was delayed because the Justice Department 
demanded that the banks plead guilty to criminal charges.205  Settlements 
with the Justice Department, and with other U.S. regulators, were 
eventually reached in May 2015 that required the payment of $5.6 billion 
by six large banks, viz, UBS AG, Barclays, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and the Royal Bank of Scotland.206  All of these banks, 
except Deutsche Bank, had been involved in the earlier $4.3 billion 
 
contracts using methodology similar to that used for non-trade currencies.  Fix 
rates for forward and non-deliverable forward contracts are published using a 
premium or discount to the spot rate for the relevant currency pair. 
Other FX benchmark rates are also priced through the use of indicative rates.  
For instance, the Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar Emerging Markets Trade 
Association (“EMTA”) benchmark rates are based on indicative rates submitted 
by market participants to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), which 
takes the midpoint of submitted bid offer pairs that it randomly selects, discards 
the highest and lowest midpoints, and calculates the final benchmark rate using 
the mean of the remaining midpoints. 
HSBC Bank plc, CFTC Docket No. 15-07 (2014). 
 203.   Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA Sanctions Foreign 
Exchange Manipulation at UBS, (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Pages/mm-
ubs-devisenhandel-20141112.aspx [https://perma.cc/MJR4-Y7QX]. 
 204.  Barclays Reports Loss after Forex Probe Provision, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), (Mar. 3, 
2015), http://on.ft.com/1NW8C6t [https://perma.cc/5RZT-B5MJ]. 
 205.  Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Justice Department is Seeking Felony 
Pleas by Big Banks in Foreign Currency Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/u-s-is-seeking-felony-pleas-by-big-banks-in-
foreign-currency-inquiry/ [https://perma.cc/3WQQ-JYNP]. 
 206.  Vogelli & Miller, supra note 201.  See also Corkery & Protess, supra note 202 
(discussing how the four large global banks plead guilty to federal crimes involving a 
scheme to manipulate the world’s currencies). 
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settlement described above.207 
In the May 2015 settlement UBS AG agreed to pay $202 million to 
the Justice Department and $342 million to the Federal Reserve Board.  
UBS also agreed to plead guilty to one count of criminal fraud.  The fine 
and guilty pleas were based on a claim that UBS’ foreign exchange 
activities breached a prior non-prosecution agreement that was entered into 
as a part of the LIBOR settlement described above.208  Such agreements 
allow a party to avoid criminal prosecution for a crime (e.g., the LIBOR 
manipulation) on the condition that they engage in no other criminal 
activity for some specified period of time.  UBS also agreed to pay the 
Connecticut Department of Banking for “unsafe . . . practices related to its 
[foreign-exchange] market activity.”209 
Barclays agreed with the Department of Justice to plead guilty to 
criminal antitrust violations for its foreign exchange transgressions.  It also 
agreed to pay a total of $2.4 billion to settle claims brought by the CFTC, 
the Federal Reserve Board, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority and the 
New York Department of Financial Services.  The latter regulator also 
required Barclays to fire eight employees.210  Barclays was additionally 
found to have breached its LIBOR non-prosecution agreement through its 
foreign exchange trading and was fined $60 million for that violation.  In 
November 2015, Barclays also settled claims brought by the State of New 
York that it abused a so-called “last look” trading procedure on its 
electronic currency exchange trading platform at the expense of customers.  
“Last look” allowed the bank a small period of time to cancel a trade it 
accepted after the fact where market conditions changed adversely.  This 
feature was intended to be a defense against HFTs, but was abused by 
using it to cancel customer trades that were part of their regular market-
making activities but which would have caused the bank a loss.211 
JPMorgan Chase was required to pay a total of $892 million to the 
Department of Justice and Federal Reserve Board in these second round 
 
 207.  See VOGELLI & MILLER, supra note 201 and accompanying text (summarizing the 
penalties paid by various large banks). 
 208.  Antoine Gara, Swiss Bank UBS to Pay $342 Million Currency Manipulation Fine, 




 209.  Id. 
 210.  Corkery & Protess, supra note 202. 
 211.  Greg Farrell, Barclays Pays $150 Million to Settle New York Currency Probe, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 18,2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-
18/barclays-pays-150-million-to-settle-new-york-currency-probe [https://perma.cc/ZBN7-
8ACR]. 
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settlements.  Citigroup agreed to pay a total of $1.26 billion.  The Royal 
Bank of Scotland agreed to pay $669 million, and Bank of America agreed 
to pay the Federal Reserve Board $205 million.212 
The plea agreements with the Justice Department charged that the 
defendant banks conspired to fix, stabilize, maintain, decrease or increase 
the price of and rig bids and offers for the EUR/USD currency pairs by 
eliminating competition.  It was further alleged that this was done through 
daily conversations in an electronic chat room, sometimes in code.  This 
chat room was called the “cartel” or the “Mafia,” and membership was 
limited to employees of the co-conspirator banks.213  Through these 
conservations the defendants coordinated: 
the trading of the EUR/USD currency pair in connection with 
European Central Bank and World Markets/Reuters benchmark 
currency “fixes” which occurred at 2:15 PM (CET) and 4:00 PM 
(GMT) each trading day; and (ii) refraining from certain trading 
behavior, by withholding bids and offers, when one conspirator 
held an open risk position, so that the price of the currency traded 
would not move in a direction adverse to the conspirator with an 
open risk position.214 
5. The BONY Settlement 
Separate actions were brought against the Bank of New York Mellon 
(BONY) by the Justice Department, the Department of Labor, the SEC, the 
New York attorney general (NYAG),215 and the Florida attorney general.216  
The NYAG charged that BONY had promised certain foreign exchange 
customers that they would receive the “best execution,” the “best rate of the 
day,” and the “the most attractive/competitive rate available to the 
Bank.”217  In fact, as alleged by the NYAG, BONY was executing those 
orders at the worst rate traded during the trading date and kept the 
 
 212.  Gina Chon, Caroline Binham & Laura Noonan, Six Banks Fined $5.6 Bn Over 
Rigging of Foreign Exchange Markets, FIN. TIMES (LONDON) (May 20, 2015, 6:37 PM), 
http://on.ft.com/1EjpSHB [https://perma.cc/4Q5S-XXTE]. 
 213.  Plea Agreement at 4(i), United States v. Barclays, PLC (2015). 
 214.  Id. at 4(h). 
 215.  BNY to Pay $714 Million to Settle Foreign Exchange Cases, FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 
2015, http://fortune.com/2015/03/19/bny-mellon-settlement-exchange/ 
[https://perma.cc/4VUC-KXNA]. 
 216.  News Release, Att’y Gen. Pam Bondi, Attorney General Pam Bondi Announces 
$28 Million Settlement with Bank of New York Mellon (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/B342E613410013CA85257C160
065FCD8 [https://perma.cc/4SMU-WJEN]. 
 217.  People v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 114735/09, 40 Misc.3d 1232[A], 2013 
NY slip op 51394[U]. 
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difference between that worst price and the price existing at the time of 
execution.  It was further alleged in the New York action that BONY made 
some $2 billion from these transactions over the course of a decade.218 
A New York Supreme Court judge held that these allegations were 
sufficient to make out a case under the New York Martin Act against 
BONY.219  The New York court in the BONY case considered whether the 
New York Martin Act covered the foreign currency exchange transactions 
at issue.  As described above,220 the Martin Act was amended in 1925 to 
extend its coverage to foreign currency orders.221  BONY contended that 
this term did not apply to currency transactions executed pursuant to 
standing instructions from customers that directed currency transactions to 
be executed automatically without price negotiation.  The court declined to 
rule on that claim because it had an insufficient basis to decide the issue.  
The court also found the legislative history of the Martin Act amendment 
with respect to that term to be scant and its meaning unclear. 
A federal court dismissed some charges brought by the Department of 
Justice, but allowed a claim over whether BONY misrepresented that it was 
providing best execution prices for foreign exchange to go forward.222  That 
court also allowed similar claims in class actions brought by BONY 
custodial clients over these practices to proceed.223  However, that decision 
may not be consistent with an earlier opinion by the Fourth Circuit in 
Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber.224  In Tauber, the court rejected a claim that 
a dealer had made an oral agreement that a customer would receive the 
“best price” because the defendant had touted its execution abilities.  The 
court noted that all trades had been confirmed in writing.  Although the 
confirmations did not include any “best pricing” clause, the plaintiff never 
objected to the terms of the contracts.225 
BONY settled these state and federal claims and related class actions 
for $714 million in March 2015.226  However, this case did not end the 
 
 218.  Id. at 2. 
 219.  Id. at 13. 
 220.  See, supra note 93 (describing how the Martin Act was amended to cover foreign 
currency orders and options). 
 221.  N.Y Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2015). 
 222.  U.S. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 223.  See, e.g., In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., 921 F. 
Supp.2d 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying bank’s motion to dismiss transportation authority’s 
claims alleging the bank’s failure to provide best execution price for funds’ exchange 
transaction). 
 224.  Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 
1031 (1994). 
 225.  Id. at 979. 
 226.  BNY to Pay $714 Million to Settle Foreign Exchange Cases, supra note 215. 
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foreign exchange investigations of the large banks by New York.  The New 
York Department of Financial Services, an agency separate from the 
NYAG, was conducting an investigation of the electronic trading platforms 
created by the large banks for trading foreign exchange.  That agency was 
apparently concerned that the banks were manipulating prices or engaging 
in abusive trading practices on those platforms.227  The New York attorney 
general also launched an investigation to determine whether several large 
traders were “spoofing” trades in the foreign exchange market. Spoofing 
involves the entry of orders a trader intends to cancel before execution in 
order to mislead other traders on market conditions.228 
6. State Street Bank Action 
The state of California sued State Street Bank, claiming that the state’s 
two giant public employee pension funds had been defrauded by foreign 
exchange overcharges.229  State Street paid $60 million to settle a class 
action suit over that issue that was brought in Massachusetts, and it 
remained under investigation by the SEC.230 
7. Bank of England Scandal 
Improper sharing and aggregation of institutional customer orders for 
foreign exchange caused a scandal at the Bank of England in 2014, which 
was made aware of such practices as early as 2006.  The Bank suspended 
one of its employees in March 2014 in connection with an investigation of 
that trading.  That suspension was followed by others at BNP Paribas and 
Bank of America who were sharing customer information.  Some two-
dozen foreign exchange traders were suspended or fired as a result of this 
 
 227.  Gina Chon & Ben McLannahan, NY Regulator Raises Spectre of Further Forex 
Penalties for Banks, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 22, 2015, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/092572d2-0005-11e5-abd5-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz47RavEjHo [https://perma.cc/GF3S-SJX5]. 
 228.  Liz Moyer, New York Opens Inquiry Into Electronic Trade ‘Spoofing,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/business/dealbook/new-york-opens-
inquiry-into-electronic-trade-spoofing.html?WT.mc_id=SmartBriefs-
Newsletter&WT.mc_ev=click&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6YWR-6XUU]. 
 229.  Press Release, Att’y Gen. Kamala D. Harris, Brown Sues State Street Bank for 
Massive Fraud Against CalPERS and CalSTRS (Oct. 20, 2009), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/brown-sues-state-street-bank-massive-fraud-against-
calpers-and-calstrs [https://perma.cc/7X45-VLEN]. 
 230.  Andrew Harris, State Street Agrees to Settle Forex Fee Suit for $60 Mln, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, July 9, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-
09/state-street-agrees-to-settle-forex-fee-case-for-60-mln [https://perma.cc/HR6E-AYQQ]. 
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inquiry.231 
A subsequent investigation concluded that the Bank of England’s 
chief foreign exchange dealer was aware that traders were sharing 
aggregated information about customer orders in order to match those 
orders with others.  Such matching was itself not improper but presented 
the opportunity for collusive conduct.232  Another report asserted that a 
Bank of England official was included on emails of traders discussing the 
manipulation of the currency prices.233 
8. Class Actions 
The press reported that foreign exchange traders among several large 
banks and a large energy firm were using chat rooms to exchange 
information that allowed them to manipulate the market and take advantage 
of customer orders.234  Several class actions were brought over this activity.  
A district court denied a motion to dismiss consolidated class actions 
challenging the foreign currency trading practices under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.235 
The complaint in this case charged that the defendants had conspired 
to manipulate the daily Fix rate.236  That manipulation was alleged to have 
occurred through concerted trading strategies that were formulated in “chat 
rooms, with evocative names such as ‘The Cartel,’ ‘The Bandits’ Club,’ 
 
 231.  Bank, Fix Thyself, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21598678-bank-england-faces-
questions-over-its-role-rigged-forex-deals-bank-fix [https://perma.cc/N3MM-WEZ6]. 
 232.  Lord Grabiner QC, Bank of England Foreign Exchange Market Investigation, 
Report, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2014/grabiner.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KB46-KPTV] (last visited May 5, 2015). 
 233.  David Enrich, Bank of England Official Received Emails Relating to Libor 
Manipulation, Prosecutor Says, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2015, http://on.wsj.com/1V3AGns 
[https://perma.cc/8NXU-CUSW]. 
 234.  Liam Vaughan, Cartel: How BP Used a Secret Chat Room for Insider Tips, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Dec. 29, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-
30/cartel-chat-room-tied-to-bp-gave-fx-tips-from-banks-to-client [https://perma.cc/3E7N-
D9CL]. 
 235.  15 U.S.C. § 1, 2. 
 236.  In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
The daily “fixing” of rates sets a benchmark for pricing currencies: 
Institutions find it useful to take a snapshot of how much is being bought and 
sold. This happens every day in the 30 seconds before and after 16:00 in 
London and the result is known as the 4pm fix, or just the fix. The fix is very 
important, as it is the peg on which many other financial markets depend. 
Sebastian Chrispin, Forex Scandal: How to Rig a Market, BBC (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905 [https://perma.cc/5ULZ-9H3C]. 
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The ‘Mafia’ and ‘One Team, One Dream’ . . . .”237  Through those chat 
rooms, the defendants’ foreign exchange traders were alleged to have 
shared market-sensitive information, including “information about 
pricing,” their customers’ orders and their net trading positions in advance 
of 4 p.m. London time. 
Using this nonpublic information, the defendants were alleged to have 
set the Fix at an artificial level by “banging the close” through trades 
broken up into small orders that would have a greater cumulative effect on 
the Fix and by “painting the screen” through fake orders. 238  The 
defendants were also charged with “front running” customer orders.239  
Three of the defendant banks settled these actions.  UBS AG paid $135 
million in that settlement; JPMorgan Chase & Co. paid $99.5 million.240  
Bank of America agreed to pay an additional $180 million.241  More 
settlements followed, and by August 2015, the total agreed to be paid in 
these class action lawsuits exceeded $2 billion.  The additional settling 
banks included Goldman Sachs, HSBC Holdings Plc, Barclays, Plc, and 
BNP Paribas, SA; more settlements were expected from seven other large 
banks that were also named as defendants in that litigation.242 
9. Regulatory Response 
The U.S. Justice Department was reported to have expanded its 
investigations into foreign currency manipulations in 2015 to include the 
Russian ruble and Brazilian real and was considering actions against 
individual traders.243  Bank regulators were also seeking enhancements in 
the regulation of the interbank exchange market after the price 
 
 237.  In re Foreign Exch., 74 F. Supp. 3d at 587. 
 238.  Id. at 594. 
 239.  Id. Front running involves a broker trading for its own account with knowledge that 
a customer will be trading at a price that will allow the broker to profit from its prior trade. 
See Jerry W. Markham, “Front-Running”— Insider Trading Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69 (1988) (describing front running concerns). 
 240.  Eric Larson & Phil Milford, BofA Investors Say Settlement Reached in Forex Class 
Action, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Apr. 16, 2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/bofa-investors-say-settlement-
reached-in-forex-class-action [https://perma.cc/U884-CFHT]. 
 241.  Christina Rexrode, Bank of America to Pay $180 Million to Settle Investors’ Forex 
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bank-of-america-to-pay-
180-million-to-settle-private-forex-lawsuit-1430340190 [https://perma.cc/EB3C-RRY2]. 
 242.  Nate Raymond, Currency-Rigging Lawsuit Settlements Rise Past $2 Billion: 
Lawyer, REUTERS, Aug. 13, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/13/us-forex-
manipulation-settlement-idUSKCN0QI2J720150813 [https://perma.cc/L76K-AXYW]. 
 243.  Tom Schoenberg & Silla Brush, U.S. Currency Probe Said to Expand to Russia, 
Brazil, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1748 (Aug. 31, 2015). 
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manipulation scandals emerged.  The U.K. required the setting of eight 
benchmarks, including Libor and precious metals, to be administered by 
independent administrators that the FCA would regulate like public 
utilities.244  This plan, however had a few obvious flaws, i.e., who will 
assure that the independent administrator’s exchange rate setting is fair and 
is not itself manipulated, as was the case with the California electricity 
market at the turn of the century.245 
The FCA also announced that it was implementing a “remediation” 
program that would require firms operating in the interbank foreign 
exchange market to review their supervisory controls to assure they were 
sufficient to manage their foreign exchange risks.  Managers at those firms 
were also required to attest that their controls were adequate.246  Despite 
these efforts, the FCA was complaining some five years after the disclosure 
of the Libor manipulations that the rate setting mechanism for that 
benchmark was still broken.247 
The Bank of England considered whether to require that foreign 
exchange transactions be time-stamped to show when they were executed.  
This would allow a customer to determine if they received a fair price 
based on the market at the time of the time stamp.248  A global code of 
conduct was also being considered by central banks that would, among 
other things, provide guidance on what constitutes confidential customer 
information and what information may be disclosed to other traders, 
particularly information concerning orders submitted for execution in the 
daily benchmark fixing sessions.249  This effort was being led by the Bank 
for International Settlements.250 
 
 244.  Huw Jones, UK Watchdog Proposes New Rules to Avoid Excessive Fees for 
Benchmarks, REUTERS, June 3, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/03/britain-
regulations-markets-idAFL5N0YP27820150603 [https://perma.cc/6YSF-54MT]. 
 245.  See Jerry W. Markham & Lawrence Hunt Jr., The California Energy Crisis—
Enron’s Gaming of Governor Gray’s Imperfect Market, 24 Fut. & Derv. L. Rep. 1 (2004) 
(describing those manipulations). 
 246.  FCA, supra note 203. 
 247.  Juliet Samuel and Chiara Albanese, No Fix for Libor: Benchmark Still Broken, 
Regulators Say, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/libor-reform-has-
not-gone-far-enough-says-regulator-1436195584 [https://perma.cc/VL4L-C4K2]. 
 248.  Sheryl Gesto Obejera, Report: UK Treasury Wants BoE to Consider Time Stamps 
for Forex Trades, SNL, Apr. 6, 2015, http://www.smartbrief.com/04/07/15/boe-reportedly-
faces-pressure-weigh-fx-time-stamp#.VSaM51w-BBw [https://perma.cc/4VKF-P7SY]. 
 249.  Patrick Graham, Exclusive: Central Banks Agree New Rules for FX Market 
Conduct, REUTERS, Mar. 23, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/03/23/us-fx-
investigation-idINKBN0MJ1NI20150323 [https://perma.cc/P8CP-7C8P]. 
 250.  Patrick Graham, 2-BIS Sets Sights on Single Global FX Code of Conduct, REUTERS, 
May 11, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/11/forex-codes-
idUKL5N0Y22QS20150511 [https://perma.cc/Z29H-VZTB].  The Financial Stability 
Board, which coordinates international banking regulation, reported in October 2015 that 
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III. THE RETAIL OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE CASH MARKET 
The dissolution of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime led 
to the vast expansion of the commercial interbank foreign exchange 
market.  It also led to the rapid growth of a retail market for foreign 
exchange for international travelers. Those retail dealers in foreign 
currencies were often found in kiosks in airports and on the streets of 
popular tourist destinations.  Bank branches also provided foreign 
exchange services.251  In making exchange transactions, travelers are 
required to exchange at the dealer’s quoted bid or ask price, a difference 
that is called a “spread.”  This spread is the dealer’s profit in foreign 
exchange transactions.  Consequently, there will nearly always be a 
difference between the quoted bids and offers, the bid being lower than the 
offer.252 
To illustrate, someone traveling to London changing dollars into 
pounds would pay a retail dealer rate at the quoted ask price from the 
branch office of a bank or currency kiosk on the street.  When returning to 
the United States, that traveler would, assuming the dealer’s spread has not 
changed, exchange any remaining pounds for dollars at a rate lower than 
she received when selling those same dollars.  This is the spread through 
which these moneychangers profit.  That traveler may also be charged an 
additional service fee or commissions by dealers, thereby further increasing 
the cost of the currency conversion.  All things being equal, the dealer will 
profit on the difference in the spreads.  In fact, all things might not be 
equal, as when the dealer has an imbalance of currency in inventory that 
declines.  The dealer will be constantly adjusting its spread prices to reflect 
changes in the relative value of the currencies in which it deals.253 
In contrast to the dealer, a speculator will try to profit from changes in 
the relative value of one currency versus another.  For example, a 
speculator might exchange pounds for dollars at today’s rate in hopes that 
those pounds will increase in value and can be resold for dollars at an 
increased amount of dollars.  In order to profit, however, the pound will 
have to increase enough to offset the dealer’s spread and any commissions 
 
progress had been made on London fixings but that more was needed.  Chiara Albanese, 
Currencies Trading Needs Further Cleanup, Regulators Say, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Oct. 1, 
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/currencies-trading-needs-further-cleanup-regulators-say-
1443699941 [https://perma.cc/8BAP-9PU3]. 
 251.  See Foreign Exchange Markets and Technology, CLOANTO, July 7, 2012, 
http://currencysystem.com/kb/13-138 (describing the retail tier of the foreign exchange 
market) [https://perma.cc/3A5H-ZF8G]. 
 252.  See What is Forex, FXCM, https://www.fxcm.com/forex/what-is-forex/ 
[https://perma.cc/3KM2-E8UB] (last visited May 13, 2015) (describing the dealer’s spread). 
 253.  See id. (describing how speculators profit). 
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or fees. 
Historically, most foreign exchange dealers required retail customers 
to pay a much broader so-called “spread” than was available to commercial 
parties in the interbank foreign exchange market.  However, the 
introduction of electronic trading platforms at the end of the last century 
resulted in more competition and narrower spreads in both the retail and 
commercial markets.  “While in the 1980s the bid-ask spreads in the over-
the-counter market were roughly 20 times those in the inter-dealer market, 
they have since compressed and are roughly equal.”254  Still, travelers using 
a bureau de change to convert their currencies will be charged a wider 
spread than available to direct bank customers and/or a commission.255 
Retail cash foreign currency transactions using credit or debit cards 
also pay a dealer’s spread and are subject to conversion fees charged by the 
banks issuing the cards.  This means that the retail credit or credit card 
customer receives two hits when converting, because the banks generally 
use a currency exchange rate less favorable than that available in the 
commercial interbank market, to which is added the conversion fee.  Those 
charges have been the subject of extended litigation. 
A class action lawsuit brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act256 
sought damages on behalf of holders of credit cards from Visa, 
MasterCard, and Diners Club who were charged currency conversion fees 
between February 1, 1996 and November 8, 2006.257  The plaintiffs claimed 
that those defendants and their banks conspired to set and conceal currency 
conversion fees that generally ranged from one to three percent of foreign 
transactions even when the banks were not exchanging any currency.  As a 
district court described this claim: 
[P]laintiffs allege that the procedure VISA and MasterCard use to 
process all foreign currency transactions, sometimes referred to 
as ‘netting out,’ often leads to the bulk of foreign currency 
transactions being conducted without an actual purchase or sale 
of any foreign currency. Plaintiffs offer the following example: 
‘if 100 U.S. VISA cardholders in France charge U.S. $10,000 in 
French francs in goods on March 26, 2001, and 100 French VISA 
cardholders in the U.S. spend the equivalent of U.S. $10,000 on 
the same day, defendant VISA does not actually convert any 
 
 254.  Sterk v. Bank of America Corp., No. 15 CV 2705 Class Action Complaint at ¶¶78-
79 (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 2015). 
 255.  See Exchange Rates, LONDONFX, http://www.londonfx.co.uk/exchrate.html 
[https://perma.cc/C433-8QVR] (last visited May 13, 2015) (describing these differences in 
spreads and fees). 
 256.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 257.  In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 265 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
ARTICLE 4 (MARKHAM) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:11 PM 
832 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
currency.’ VISA and MasterCard automatically impose this 
currency conversion fee on the cardholder at the network level. 
 
There are two tranches of currency conversion fees charged by 
VISA and MasterCard. The first, which plaintiffs label the ‘first 
tier’ fee, is charged by VISA and MasterCard at an identical 1% 
of the purchase price. This 1% first tier fee is paid by the 
cardholder and retained by the respective associations. The 
‘second tier’ fee is ‘typically’ two percent (2%), and is often 
charged on top of the 1% first tier fee. This 2% second tier fee is 
automatically charged by the network, paid by the cardholder, 
and retained by the cardholder’s issuing bank.258 
The complaint further charged that Visa and MasterCard inflated their 
exchange rates before applying their currency conversion fees.259  The 
defendants contended that these claims were subject to arbitration and 
sought dismissal of the class action claims.  The district court required a 
trial on that issue and that order was affirmed on appeal.260  The plaintiffs 
claimed damages of some $3.8 billion,261 but the case was subsequently 
settled for about $50 million.262 
Credit card charges for cross-border transactions continued to be of 
concern.  MasterCard capped its currency exchange fees in 2009 after it 
was advised by the European Commission’s competition authority that its 
fees were too high.  In 2015, that same regulator charged MasterCard with 
charging excessive fees for transactions between countries in the European 
Union (EU) and for transactions on cards outside the EU.263 
IV. EXCHANGE TRADED FOREIGN EXCHANGE FUTURES 
A. Background 
Commodity futures contracts on agricultural products have been 
 
 258.  Id. at 393-394. 
 259.  Id. at 396. 
 260.  Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 261.  In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1409), 
https://www.ccfsettlement.com/faqs/#idQ15 [https://perma.cc/P2RA-PFZ3]. 
 262.  In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1409), 
http://www.ccfsettlement.com/documents/Ross%20v%20Amex%20Preliminary%20Approv
al%20Motion%20-%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P76D-D4LN] 
 263.  European Antitrust Regulator Accuses MasterCard of Excessive Card Fees, 
REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/eu-antitrust-mastercard-
idUSL8N0ZP20T20150709 [http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/eu-antitrust-
mastercard-idUSL8N0ZP20T20150709] 
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traded on exchanges since the Civil War.264  Coincidentally, the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods agreement occurred at a time when the futures 
industry was experimenting with the introduction of derivative instruments 
that were based on price changes in financial instruments.  One such 
initiative involved the development of a futures market in foreign exchange 
called the International Monetary Market (IMM).  That exchange was 
boosted by the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman who 
supported the creation of such an exchange after his bank refused to allow 
him to take a short position in the British pound in anticipation of a 
devaluation of that currency.265  Traders on the IMM also engaged in 
foreign exchange transactions in the commercial interbank market.  Those 
traders accounted for about 15 percent of volume in the interbank market 
by 1980.266 
B. The CFTC’s Jurisdiction 
Attending these developments was the enactment of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTC Act).267  That legislation 
amended the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA).  Among other 
things, the CFTC Act created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC).  The CFTC replaced the Commodity Exchange Authority, a small 
bureau in the Department of Agriculture, as the regulator responsible for 
enforcing the CEA.268  This new agency was thought necessary because the 
resources of the Commodity Exchange Authority proved inadequate to deal 
with heavy trading volumes and the expansion of futures trading on 
financial and other products that occurred during the inflationary period 
that began in the 1960s.269 
The CEA initially applied only to futures contracts on a limited 
number of agricultural commodities.  Several amendments to the CEA over 
 
 264.  See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS 
REGULATION 2 (1987) (describing the nature and history of commodity futures trading). 
 265.  See MELAMED, supra note 137, at 170-177 (describing the development of the 
International Monetary Market). 
 266.  JULIAN, WAMSLEY, THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE HANDBOOK 15 (1983). 
 267.  Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 
Stat. 1389 (1974). 
 268.  Under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 as it then existed, the Department of 
Agriculture had day-to-day oversight responsibility for futures trading, which duties were 
fulfilled by the Commodity Exchange Authority. However, the Commodity Exchange 
Commission set policy for futures trading under that Act. That commission was composed 
of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce and the Attorney General. MARKHAM, supra 
note 264, at 27. 
 269.  Id. at 55-65. The CFTC is a five member independent federal agency similar to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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the years expanded its reach to other agricultural products on which futures 
trading had expanded to include.  Congress, however, was unable to keep 
pace with the rapid expansion of futures trading to additional commodities, 
including non-agricultural commodities, such as gold and silver.  The 
CFTC Act changed the approach of regulation from regulating only certain 
enumerated commodities to a broader approach of regulating all exchange 
traded commodity futures, whatever the commodity.  The CFTC was given 
exclusive jurisdiction over all such exchange traded commodity futures and 
options contracts.270 
The CEA requires all futures contracts, with limited exceptions, to be 
traded on a board of trade that is registered with the CFTC as a “designated 
contract market” (DCM).  One exception to this requirement, the so-called 
“Treasury Amendment,” that was included in the CFTC Act in order to 
exclude the commercial interbank foreign exchange market from the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction.  A Senate Report on the CFTC Act noted that: “[a] 
great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried 
out through an informal network of banks and tellers.”271  The report 
concluded “this market is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory 
agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this legislation is 
unnecessary.”272 
The Treasury Amendment stated that the CFTC would have no 
jurisdiction to regulate “transactions in foreign currency . . . unless such 
transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a 
board of trade.”273  As described below, this meant that, unlike other 
commodities, futures and options on foreign exchange could be traded in 
the OTC market.  As also described below, such OTC trading was beyond 
the reach of the CFTC until additional legislation was added to allocate 
jurisdiction among the CFTC, bank regulators and the SEC. 
C. Regulated Futures Contracts on Foreign Currency 
DCMs are required to use a clearinghouse that is registered with the 
CFTC as a “derivatives clearing organization” (DCO).  These DCOs are 
required to clear and guarantee the performance of futures and options 
contracts trade on DCMs.  The DCOs are required to meet certain core 
principles such as assuring the sufficiency of their settlement procedures, 
risk management, system safeguards and default procedures.274 
 
 270.  Id. at 67. 
 271.  S. Rep. No. 93-1131 (1974). 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). 
 274.  See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Commodity Futures and Exchange Traded 
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DCMs are required to police their members to ensure that they comply 
with the exchange’s rules.  There are also broad reaching registration and 
regulatory requirements for industry participants.  Those registrants include 
futures commission merchants (FCMs).275  FCMs act as brokers for 
customer orders and accept customer funds in connection with those orders.  
FCMs are subject to a number of regulatory requirements under the CEA. 
They include financial reporting requirements,276 a minimum net capital 
requirement,277 a requirement that customer funds be kept segregated278 and 
extensive recordkeeping requirements.279  Risk disclosure statements must 
also be given to customers. 
These protections do not assure that customers will not lose money in 
trading exchange regulated foreign currency transactions.  In one case, the 
Second Circuit found that an individual trader lost $215 million from 
trading on foreign currency futures over the course of less than five months 
in 1994-1995.280  The Court ruled in that case that the trader’s FCM owed 
him no fiduciary duty to provide advice and warnings of the dangers of 
such trades.  This was because the trader was wealthy and sophisticated and 
was aware from experience of the dangers of such trading.281 
D. Anti-Manipulation Authority 
The CEA prohibits manipulation282 and certain disruptive trading 
 
Options, Bloomberg/BNA, Securities Practice Portfolio Series, II. (2015) (describing the 
role and regulation of DCOs). 
 275.  7 U.S.C. § 6d. 
 276.  17 C.F.R. § 1.10. 
 277.  17 C.F.R. §§ 1.12, 1.17. 
 278.  17 C.F.R. § 1.20. 
 279.  17 C.F.R.  §1.31. 
 280.  As the Court noted: 
In a period of less than five months in 1994-95, plaintiff Henryk de 
Kwiatkowski (“Kwiatkowski”) made and lost hundreds of millions of dollars 
betting on the U.S. dollar by trading in currency futures. Kwiatkowski traded on 
a governmental scale: At one point, his positions accounted for 30 percent of the 
total open interest in certain currencies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
After netting over $200 million in the first trading weeks, Kwiatkowski’s 
fortunes turned; between late December 1994 and mid-January 1995, 
Kwiatkowski suffered single-day losses of $112 million, $98 million, and $70 
million. He continued losing money through the winter. Having lost tens of 
millions over the preceding several days, Kwiatkowski liquidated all his 
positions starting on Sunday, March 5 and finishing the next day. In all, 
Kwiatkowski had suffered net losses of $215 million. 
De Kwiatowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 281.  Id. at 1308-1309. 
 282.  7 U.S.C. §§ 9(1), 13(a)(2). 
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practices, such as wash sales.283  The anti-manipulation prohibitions 
contained in the CEA, when it was enacted in 1936, were at the very heart 
of the effort by Congress to regulate the commodity futures markets.  
However, the CEA failed to define what it meant by manipulation.  It was 
therefore left to the government and the courts to define the term.284  They 
came up with a four-part test that requires the following elements to be 
proved in order to establish an actual commodity price manipulation: 
1. the trader had the ability to influence market prices; 
2. the trader specifically intended to create an artificial price; 
3. an artificial price occurred; and 
4. the trader caused the artificial price.285 
In an attempted manipulation case, the CFTC has asserted that it need only 
prove specific intent through some overt act that was intended to be 
manipulative.286  The elements of manipulation and attempted manipulation 
are very difficult to prove, especially the specific intent requirement.287  
Indeed, while obtaining numerous settlements, the CFTC has won only one 
adjudicated manipulation case in its forty-year history.288 
To ease the burden of proving manipulative intent the Dodd-Frank Act 
in 2010 amended the CEA to add language borrowed from Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“34 Act”), which prohibits any 
“manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”289  It was thought that 
this language would ease the burden of proving manipulative intent 
because the courts had interpreted it to require only a showing of 
recklessness.290 However, this is still a very high standard of intent and the 
 
 283.  7 U.S.C. § 6c. 
 284.  See Jerry W. Markham, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The 
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (l99l) (describing the background for this 
legislation and the effects of a lack of definition). 
 285.  Frey v. CFTC, 931 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 286.  In the Matter of Hohenberg Bros., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶20, 271, n. 41 
(C.F.T.C. 1977). 
 287.  JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET 
MANIPULATION (2014) (describing the difficulty of proving manipulation charges). 
 288.  In the Matter of Diplacido, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. ¶30,970 (C.F.T.C. 2008), aff’d sub 
nom., DiPlacido v.  CFTC, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22692 (2d Cir. 2009), 
cert denied, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 2461 (2010). 
 289.  15 U.S.C. §78j(b). 
 290.  See, e.g., South Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109-110 
(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the Second Circuit has long held that reckless disregard for the 
truth satisfies the scienter element of a securities fraud action); Robert N. Clemens Trust v. 
Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Sixth Circuit 
has long held reckless behavior satisfies the scienter element of a securities fraud action); 
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F. 2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (interpreting the scienter element of a securities fraud action as 
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difference between that standard and the specific intent required under the 
pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation authority may be only slight.291 
A class action lawsuit was filed in the wake of the interbank foreign 
exchange market scandals that are described above.  That follow-on suit 
charged that the twelve large banks involved in the London Fix 
manipulations were also manipulating regulated foreign exchange futures 
contracts that were traded on two regulated DCMs.292  The complaint 
charged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and violations of the anti-
manipulation provisions of the CEA and CFTC rules.293  That litigation was 
pending as of the date of this writing. 
E. Exchange Traded Foreign Exchange Options 
The CFTC allowed the trading of foreign currency options on 
regulated DCMs, but the SEC challenged the CFTC’s otherwise broad 
exclusive jurisdiction over exchange-traded derivatives with respect to the 
trading of options on foreign currencies. In 1973, the creation of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE) laid the groundwork for 
that regulatory competition.  Created by a futures exchange, the CBOE 
traded options on stock in a manner used by the commodity futures 
exchanges.294  The SEC assumed jurisdiction over that exchange because 
options on stock had been traditionally within its jurisdiction.  The creation 
of the CBOE also predated the CFTC Act of 1974, and at that time the 
CEA did not then cover futures or options on financial instruments. 
As the Seventh Circuit noted in resolving a jurisdictional dispute 
between the SEC and the futures exchange that created the CBOE: 
The CBOE itself, the nation’s first central market for securities 
options, evolved from an effort by the Chicago Board of Trade in 
the late 1960’s to develop futures contracts in securities. At that 
time, however, such activity did not fall within the Commodity 
Exchange Act, the statute governing other Chicago Board of 
Trade activity. As a result, the plan was modified to qualify it as 
 
a recklessness standard). 
 291.  See MARKHAM, supra note 287 at § 8:2 (describing further why the two standards 
may vary only slightly). 
 292.  Robert Mackenzie Smith, CME Forex Fix Questioned in New Lawsuit, RISK.NET 
(May 8, 2015), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2407756/cme-forex-fix-questioned-
in-new-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3GYR-R7EA]. 
 293.  Sterk v. Bank of America Corp., No. 15 CV 2705 Class Action Complaint 
(S.D.N.Y. April 7, 2015). 
 294.  See generally Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity 
Options—Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALBANY L. REV. 741 (1983) 
(detailing the creation of the CBOE). 
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an options program under the Federal securities laws. Had the 
plan emerged after the 1974 amendments to the Commodity 
Exchange Act, when the term “commodity” was broadened to 
encompass securities and the CFTC was awarded exclusive 
regulatory jurisdiction, the Chicago Board of Trade could have 
retained its original objective of trading securities futures 
contracts on its own floor under the same statute-the Commodity 
Exchange Act-governing its other activities. The divergence of 
securities options trading from futures trading was fortuitous, 
therefore, due to a state of the law at the time that no longer 
applies.295 
The SEC began squabbling over the scope of the CFTC’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over options and futures on financial instruments soon after the 
creation of the CFTC.  The SEC was unsuccessful in curbing the CFTC’s 
regulation of derivative financial instruments.  The respective chairmen of 
the two agencies then reached an agreement delineating their respective 
roles.296  That agreement was included in the Futures Trading Act of 
1982.297  Among other things, that legislation gave the SEC jurisdiction 
over trading in foreign exchange on national securities exchanges 
registered with that agency.  The CFTC retained exclusive jurisdiction over 
options and futures on foreign exchange conducted on contract markets 
regulated by the CFTC.298  Trading in options on several foreign currencies 
was undertaken by various exchanges, and Nasdaq continues to trade 
options on currencies.299 
V. THE RETAIL OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
A. SEC and CFTC Jurisdiction 
Another provision in the CFTC Act gave the CFTC exclusive 
jurisdiction over most commodity options.  Previously, the CEA had, 
because of abuses, prohibited options trading on the agriculture 
commodities regulated by that statute.300  Nevertheless, trading in options 
 
 295.  Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1140, n. 2 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 296.  See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 537, 569-571 (2009) (describing the turf wars between the agencies). 
 297.  Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982). 
 298.  See Jerry W. Markham, Super-Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities 
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, Great Britain & Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 319, 360, n. 210 (2003) (describing this jurisdictional division). 
 299.  Nasdaq Spot FX Options, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/forex/spot-fx-
options.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BNK-TVNB] (last visited May 13, 2015). 
 300.  7 U.S.C. § 6c (1936). 
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on unregulated commodities had become popular in the 1970s.  That 
trading was fueled by inflation that encouraged speculation through options 
trading on precious metals and in foreign exchange after the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods agreement.  A number of scandals arose in the sale of 
those options to the public just before the creation of the CFTC.  The SEC 
stepped in and charged that those options were securities regulated under 
the federal securities laws.301 
The SEC’s action stopped much of this fraud, but the CFTC Act 
removed jurisdiction from the SEC over commodity options and granted 
the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over those instruments.302  That was not, at 
least initially, a good choice because the CFTC had no regulations in place 
to govern such trading and little staff to administer such regulations.  The 
result was a resurgence of fraud by firms marketing OTC commodity 
options.  The CFTC then tried to adopt regulations to strictly regulate OTC 
commodity option sales, but that action came too late to stop the 
widespread fraudulent sale of these instruments.303  In one famous case it 
was discovered that an escaped felon ran one of the largest fraudulent 
operations.304  The CFTC then acted to suspend all retail commodity option 
sales in 1978, but later allowed exchange traded options that could be 
closely regulated.305 
B. CFTC Jurisdiction 
The CFTC’s actions did not stop fraud in OTC foreign exchange 
instruments.  Those OTC dealers simply styled their instruments as cash or 
forward contracts that were outside the CFTC’s jurisdiction.  The CFTC 
responded with actions charging that these were actually disguised futures 
or options that had to be traded on a regulated exchange.  The CFTC was 
successful in several actions involving OTC transactions in bullion and 
other commodities, but frauds continued to proliferate.306  Disaster struck in 
1983, after J. David & Co. was discovered to be running a foreign 
exchange Ponzi scheme in San Diego that took in some $200 million from 
 
 301.  See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the 
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 17, n. 61 (1994) 
(describing those events). 
 302.  7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970) (amended 1974). 
 303.  See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 296, at 763-66 (describing these regulations 
and events). 
 304.  See Markham, supra note 116, at 54-55 (describing that scandal). 
 305.  Exempted from that ban were commercial or trade options that did not involve the 
public. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 296, at 766-68. 
 306.  See, e.g., CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(prosecuting OTC bullion dealer for selling illegal OTC futures). 
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many prominent individuals in that city.  The owner of the firm, J. David 
Dominelli, a.k.a. “Captain Money,” promised investors returns of 40 
percent from foreign currency trades that were supposedly made in the 
interbank foreign exchange market that was outside the jurisdiction of the 
CFTC.307  Dominelli received a twenty-year prison sentence, but was 
released after ten.308 
The CFTC tried to close the Treasury Amendment loophole in 1985 
through a proposed interpretation of that provision that would exclude from 
its reach foreign exchange transactions involving members of the public.  
The CFTC proposal asserted that the Treasury Amendment applied only to 
banks and large commercial institutions.309  That proposal encountered a 
storm of criticism when it was published for comment, and it was tabled.310  
Nevertheless, the CFTC continued to claim in its enforcement cases that 
the Treasury Amendment did not apply to foreign exchange transactions in 
futures or options traded in the OTC market.  That assertion resulted in a 
split among the courts that the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve. 
The Fourth Circuit held in Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber311 that 
futures and options on foreign exchange were excluded from the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction by the Treasury Amendment.  The Court noted that: 
Interpretations of the Treasury Amendment have varied with the 
role of the interpreter. The Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, pressing for greater regulation of transactions in 
foreign currencies, contends that the Treasury Amendment’s 
exemption is intended to be narrowly tailored to exclude only 
spot and cash forward transactions, leaving all other futures and 
options to be regulated by the broad inclusive regulatory 
language of the Act. Foreign currency traders and the United 
States contend that off-exchange trades must not be burdened by 
regulation, and the plain meaning of the Treasury Amendment 
expressly so provides.312 
The Court concluded, however that “the appropriate interpretation of the 
 
 307.  See DONALD BAUDER, CAPTAIN MONEY AND THE GOLDEN GIRL: THE J. DAVID 
AFFAIR (1985) (describing this Ponzi scheme). 
 308.  Nate Rawlings, Top 10 Swindlers, TIME, Mar. 7, 2012, 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2104982_2104983_2105003,
00.html [https://perma.cc/CU4B-3RWU]. 
 309.  CFTC, Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983 
(Oct. 23, 1985). 
 310.  See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 1, 9-10 (l990) (describing 
this controversy). 
 311.  8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 312.  Id. at 974-975. 
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Treasury Amendment, all off-exchange transactions in foreign currency, 
including futures and options, are exempted from regulation by the 
CEA.”313 
The Second Circuit took the opposite approach and agreed with the 
CFTC’s position that such instruments were outside the reach of the 
Treasury Amendment.314  The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in 
that case in order to resolve the circuit split.315  The Supreme Court held in 
Dunn v. CFTC316 that the Treasury Amendment excluded the CFTC from 
regulating off exchange trading in options to buy foreign currency.  That 
ruling served to encourage the continuation of widespread fraud in retail 
OTC futures and options on currencies.317 
C. The CFMA 
After its defeat in the Dunn case, the CFTC sought legislation from 
Congress that would allow it to regulate dealers selling retail foreign 
exchange futures or options.  Congress included such authority in the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).318  That 
legislation amended the CEA to prohibit the sale of retail OTC futures or 
options contracts unless the party offering the transaction was a financial 
institution, a broker-dealer registered with the SEC, a futures commission 
merchant (FCM) registered with the CFTC, an insurance company or its 
affiliates, a regulated financial holding company or an investment bank 
holding company.319 
The theory behind this legislation was to eliminate the unregulated, 
fly-by-night, fraudulent operations marketing OTC foreign exchange 
 
 313.  Id. at 976. 
 314.  CFTC v. Dunn, 58 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 315.  Dunn v. CFTC, 517 U.S. 1219 (1996). 
 316.  519 U.S. 465 (1997). 
 317.  For example, in New York Currency Research Corp. v. CFTC, 180 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 
1999), the respondent terminated its registration as a commodity trading advisor and 
commodity pool operator with the CFTC after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunn. The 
respondent then refused to respond to CFTC requests for information about its currency 
trading operations. The Second Circuit held that the respondent did not need to comply with 
the information requests because it was exempt from CFTC regulation. 
 318.  Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, § 102 (2000). 
 319.  7 U.S.C. §2(c)(2)(B) (2000). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 amended this list by removing insurance companies and financial 
and investment bank holding companies from the approved providers. In addition, Dodd-
Frank required financial institutions offering these products to be U.S. based. See Jerry W. 
Markham, Regulation of Swap and Other Over-The-Counter Derivative Contracts, 
Bloomberg/BNA Securities Practice Portfolio Series No. 263, at p. A-50 (2014) (describing 
effects of the Dodd-Frank legislation). 
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futures and options.  In their stead, only highly regulated entities with 
substantial capital were allowed to sell those products.  Congress also 
allowed “eligible contract participants” to trade foreign exchange options 
and futures with each other because those large institutions or wealthy 
individuals were not viewed to need regulatory protection.320 
Unfortunately, the CFMA left a gaping hole through which the 
fraudsters could continue their operations.  The prohibitions in the CFMA 
applied only to futures and options and not to spot or forward contracts 
where delivery of the currency was called in the party’s contracts.  The 
scope of this loophole became clear in CFTC v. Zelener,321 a decision 
rendered by the Seventh Circuit in 2004.  In Zelener, the defendants were 
selling foreign exchange as a principal to retail investors under contracts 
that were to be settled within forty-eight hours of the sale.  In fact, delivery 
and payment rarely occurred. Instead, the contracts were rolled over 
continually until the customer decided to recognize a gain or loss on the 
position. That recognition was done through a cash settlement for the 
amount of the gain or loss.  The dealer never owned any foreign currency, 
and no customer ever took delivery of any foreign currency.  Nevertheless, 
a customer could have demanded delivery, and the dealer would have been 
obligated under its contract with the customer to make the delivery.322 
The Seventh Circuit held in Zelener that these were not futures 
contracts that were subject to retail foreign exchange provisions added by 
the CFMA.  The Court noted that the contracts were not standardized and 
could not be traded on an exchange.  Moreover, the contracts called for 
actual delivery. The Court held that the fact that delivery was never made 
did not mean that the obligation was not a cash contract.323  The decision in 
Zelener was followed by the Sixth Circuit in a case involving retail foreign 
currency contracts on which no delivery was ever taken.  There, the Sixth 
Circuit held that even though it was only “pretend” trading, the transactions 
were not futures subject to CFTC regulation.324 
The loophole recognized by these decisions proved to be a costly one.  
 
 320.  See CFTC v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 862-863 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing those 
persons and reason for exemption). 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Id. at 863. 
 323.  Id. at 869. This approach of looking to the contract terms, rather than the actual 
practices of the parties, had been previously used by the Supreme Court to distinguish 
futures contracts from gambling operations. The Supreme Court held in those cases that 
futures trading was not gambling because, even though the parties rarely took delivery, the 
contracts when initiated required delivery of the underlying commodity. Board of Trade of 
City of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905); Bibb v. Allen, 149 
U.S. 481 (1893); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896). 
 324.  CFTC v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 312 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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Between 2001 and 2007 it was estimated that some 26,000 investors were 
defrauded out of over $460 million as the result of foreign exchange 
trading scams using OTC derivatives.325  The CFTC went so far as to issue 
a public warning to consumers in both English and Spanish about this 
widespread fraud.326  The CFTC also brought dozens of enforcement 
actions but was continuously thwarted by the Zelener decision.327 
 
 325.  Jerry W. Markham, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM ENRON-
ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2004-2006) 195 (2011). 
 326.  CFTC No. 4127-98 CONSUMER ADVISORY ON FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING (Mar. 
30, 1998). See also, CFTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE CURRENCY FRAUD: CFTC/NASAA 
INVESTOR ALERT, 
http://www.cftc.gov/consumerprotection/fraudawarenessprevention/foreigncurrencytrading/
cftcnasaaforexalert (detailing the widespread fraudulent transactions). This advisory 
described how these scams work: 
Forex scams attract customers with sophisticated-sounding offers placed in 
newspaper advertisements, radio promotions, or on Internet sites. Promoters 
often lure investors with the concept of leverage: the right to “control” a large 
amount of foreign currency with an initial payment representing only a fraction 
of the total cost. Coupled with predictions about supposedly inevitable increases 
in currency prices, these contracts are said to offer huge returns over a short 
time, with little or no downside risk. 
In a typical case, investors may be assured of reaping tens of thousands of 
dollars in just a few weeks or months, with an initial investment of only $5,000. 
Often, the investor’s money is never actually placed in the market through a 
legitimate dealer, but simply diverted—stolen— for the personal benefit of the 
con artists. 
Id. 
 327.  The CFTC was able to obtain default or consent judgments and ex parte restraining 
orders in numerous cases. See, e.g., CFTC v. UFOREX Consulting, LLC, Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶30,431 (W.D. La. 2006) (ordering a statutory restraining order against 
defendant); CFTC v. Intertrade Forex, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,022 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (ordering default judgment for the CFTC); CFTC v. Richmond Global Associates, 
LLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,027 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering an ex parte statutory 
restraining order freezing defendant’s assets); CFTC v. Premium Income Corp., LLC, 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,036 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (ordering an ex parte statutory 
restraining order freezing defendant’s assets and permitting expedited discovery); CFTC v. 
Sonoma Trading Corp., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,038 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (ordering an 
ex parte statutory restraining order freezing defendant’s assets and permitting expedited 
discovery); CFTC v. Ouyang, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,043 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 
(ordering a permanent injunction and ancillary relief); CFTC v. Emerald Worldwide 
Holdings, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,055 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (ordering default 
judgment for the CFTC); CFTC v. G7 Advisory Services, LLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶30,056 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (ordering an an ex parte statutory restraining order freezing 
defendant’s assets and permitting expedited discovery); CFTC v. Presidential FX, Inc.,  
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,115 (E.D. Va. 2005) (ordering a preliminary injunction 
enjoining defendant’s activities and other equitable relief); CFTC v. National Investment 
Consultants, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶30,109 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (ordering an an ex 
parte statutory restraining order freezing defendant’s assets and permitting expedited 
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D. More Legislation 
In the face of this crime wave, and after the stinging defeat in Zelener, 
the CFTC sought and obtained additional legislation to reverse its effects.  
The so-called “Zelener fix”328 was added to the CEA by the CFTC 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Reauthorization Act of 2008).329  This fix 
gave the CFTC regulatory authority over leveraged retail foreign exchange 
contracts regardless of whether they are options or futures.330  However, 
this authority did not extend to “the large, sophisticated interbank market or 
to place additional requirements on businesses with a need to engage in 
forex transactions in connection with their legitimate business activities.”331 
The Reauthorization Act of 2008 authorized the CFTC to expand its 
regulation of existing registrants that sell retail foreign exchange on a 
leveraged basis.  Those registrants included FCMs, commodity pool 
operators and commodity trading advisors.  A new category of registrant 
was also created, i.e., retail foreign exchange dealers (RFEDs), who were 
allowed to traffic in such transactions.  These firms were required to have a 
minimum capital of ten million dollars, which was increased to twenty 
million dollars in 2009.  FCMs selling these products were also subjected 
to that capital requirement.332 
 
discovery); CFTC v. International Currency Exchange, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶30,147 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering an an ex parte statutory restraining order freezing 
defendant’s assets and permitting expedited discovery). See also, JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
COMMODITIES REGULATION FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS §27:14.30 (2014) 
(describing numerous other such cases). 
 328.  See Hearing to Review Implications of the CFTC v. Zelener Case Before the 
Subcomm. on Gen. Farm Commodities and Risk Mgmt. of the Comm. on Agric., 111th 
Cong. (2009) (describing limitations of the “Zelener fix”), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52664/html/CHRG-111hhrg52664.htm 
[https://perma.cc/47A7-L9FV]. 
 329.  That statute was contained in the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008). 
 330.  See CFTC, Regulation of Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and 
Intermediaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 3281, 3285 (Jan. 20, 2010) (describing the effects of this 
amendment). 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.12, 1.17 (describing capital requirement for FCMs).  The CFTC 
has settled several cases brought against REFDs for minimum capital violations.  See e,g., 
FXDirect Dealer, LLC, No. 14-28, 2014 WL 4793547 (C.F.T.C. 2014) (ordering 
administrative proceedings where FX exchange dealer consented to findings of net capital 
violations); Global Futures and Forex, Ltd., No. 14-17, 2014 WL 2121432 (C.F.T.C. 2014) 
(ordering administrative proceedings where the net capital violation of a jointly registered 
FCM/RFED on an unconsolidated basis was found by consent); IBFX, Inc., No. 15-10, 2014 
WL 6988892 (C.F.T.C. 2014) (ordering administrative proceedings where net capital 
violations by an FX dealer were found by consent); Capital Market Services, LLC, No. 14-
12, 2014 WL 1401405 (C.F.T.C. 2014) (same). 
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These new requirements created an incentive for retail foreign 
exchange dealers to move their operations to SEC regulated broker-dealers, 
which were not subject to CFTC oversight.  This caused the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the securities industry self-
regulatory body, to issue a regulatory notice that advised broker-dealers 
engaging in retail foreign exchange that such business was subject to its 
rules.  This notice pointed out that: 
The primary forex market is the interbank market, in which large 
banks, financial institutions and other eligible participants trade 
currencies amongst themselves.  In recent years, however, an 
electronic, secondary over-the-counter (OTC) market has 
developed.  Retail customers participate in the secondary OTC 
market with retail dealers, albeit typically at different prices and 
with higher spreads than those that occur in the interbank 
market.333 
FINRA also warned of the dangers presented to retail customers by 
these instruments: 
The currency market is extremely volatile and retail forex 
customers are exposed to substantial currency risk.  Some 
currencies are significantly more volatile than others.  Many 
forex dealers extend leverage to their customers at ratios of 400:1 
or higher, which allows customers to control contracts worth 
significantly more than their cash investment.  The high leverage 
ratios magnify even minor fluctuations in currency rates, 
exponentially increasing a customer’s losses and gains.  Even a 
small move against a customer’s position can result in a 
significant loss.  Unlike margin in a securities account, forex 
customers are typically closed out of their position once their loss 
exceeds their initial investment.  However, if, for any reason, the 
position is not closed out at a zero balance, the customer could be 
liable for additional losses.334 
The FINRA notice stated that broker-dealers participating in the retail 
foreign exchange market were subject to applicable FINRA rules.335  Those 
rules require broker-dealers to comply with “just and equitable principles 
of trade.”336  Among other things, those rules require a disclosure of the 
risks of trading foreign currency and the effects of leverage.  Those 
 
 333.  FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, REGULATORY NOTICE 08-66: 
RETAIL FOREIGN CURRENCY EXCHANGE (Nov. 2008).   
 334.  Id. 
 335.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 336.  FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, RULE 2010: STANDARDS OF 
COMMERCIAL HONOR AND PRINCIPLES OF TRADE. 
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principles also prohibit false, exaggerated, unwarranted or misleading 
communications with the public, which include projections or predictions 
of profit or that past performance will recur.337 
E. The Dodd-Frank Act 
The next legislative step was to clarify jurisdiction over retail OTC 
foreign exchange trading on a leveraged basis and without actual delivery.  
This was done through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).338  That act divided jurisdiction over 
these instruments among the CFTC, SEC, and banking regulators.  Those 
agencies then adopted rules to implement this authority.339 
The CFTC promulgated a number of rules under Dodd-Frank for retail 
OTC foreign exchange transactions.340  Those rules did not apply to 
commercial trading in the interbank foreign exchange market, to 
transactions between large commercial or financial institutions known as 
eligible contract participants (ECPs), or to foreign exchange options or 
futures trading on regulated commodity exchanges.  To prevent evasion, 
commodity pools were not allowed to claim ECP status if they directly 
enter into retail foreign currency transactions with retail customers and 
have one or more direct participants that are not ECPs.341 
Among other things, the CFTC rules prohibit fraud,342 require that 
investors in these transactions be given a prescribed risk disclosure 
statement,343 continue to require minimum adjusted net capital for dealers 
of at least twenty million dollars,344 continue minimum margin 
requirements,345 require risk assessments by dealers346 and set trading and 
operational standards.347  Dealers were required to register with the industry 
self-regulatory body, the National Futures Association (NFA), and be 
 
 337.  See supra note 335 (explaining the notice). 
 338.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376-2223 (2010). 
 339.  See Markham, supra note 327 (describing this legislation and the rules adopted by 
the regulators under its provisions). 
 340.  17 C.F.R. § 5.1. 
 341.  Further Definition of ‘‘Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘Security- Based Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘Major 
Swap Participant,’’ ‘‘Major Security- Based Swap Participant’’ and ‘‘Eligible Contract 
Participant,’’ Exchange Act Release 34-66868 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,646–647 (May 23, 
2012). 
 342.  17 C.F.R. § 5.2 (2015). 
 343.  17 C.F.R. § 5.5 (2015). 
 344.  17 C.F.R. §§ 5.6, 5.7 (2015). 
 345.  17 C.F.R. § 5.9 (2015). 
 346.  17 C.F.R. §§ 5.10 & 5.11 (2015). 
 347.  17 C.F.R. § 5.18 (2015) 
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subject to its rules.348 
The NFA had previously adopted rules governing OTC trading in 
retail foreign exchange transactions by its members.349  Those transactions 
were defined in NFA rules as OTC foreign exchange transactions that are 
entered into on a leveraged or margin basis and that do not involve large 
institutions identified as ECPs, transactions where actual delivery of 
currency is made within two days or where a forward contract requires 
actual delivery between two parties having the ability to make or take 
delivery. 
NFA rules, among other things, require its members to “observe high 
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade . . . .”350  This prohibition extends to fraudulent conduct and requires 
diligent supervision of employees marketing retail foreign currency.351  
Marketing materials for retail foreign currency transactions are subject to 
review by the NFA.352  Financial information on dealers is required to be 
submitted to the NFA.353  Dealers are also required to warn customers that 
in the event of the dealer’s insolvency there would be no account insurance 
and the customer would be treated only as a general creditor.354 
In August 2015, the CFTC approved amendments to NFA rules that 
sought to enhance protections for retail foreign exchange customers dealing 
with NFA Forex Dealer Members (FDMs).  The CFTC described those 
amendments as: 
(1) imposing additional capital requirements on FDMs; (2) 
requiring FDMs to collect security deposits for off-exchange 
foreign currency transactions from eligible contract participant 
counterparties in addition to retail counterparties; (3) requiring 
FDMs to adopt and implement rigorous risk management 
programs; and (4) requiring FDMs to provide additional market 
disclosures and firm-specific information on their websites to 
permit current and potential counterparties to better assess the 
risks of engaging in off-exchange foreign currency transactions 
 
 348.  17 C.F.R. § 5.22 (2015). 
 349.  NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, FOREX TRANSACTIONS: A REGULATORY GUIDE, 
BYLAW 1057 (Feb. 13, 2007).  NFA rules governed the marketing and other practices of its 
members.  However, retail foreign currency dealers that are not registered with the CFTC as 
a FCM were not required to be members. 
 350.  NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, FOREX TRANSACTIONS: A REGULATORY GUIDE, 
RULE 2-36 (2011). 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, FOREX DEALER MEMBER REQUIREMENTS FOR 
WEEKLY FOREX REPORTS AND BANKRUPTCY DISCLOSURE, NFA NOTICE TO MEMBERS I-06-13 
(Aug. 1, 2006). 
 354.  Id. 
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and with conducting business with a particular FDM.355 
The SEC adopted a rule that subjected retail foreign exchange 
transactions to its existing rules and to those of FINRA, where the dealer 
was a registered broker-dealer.356  The SEC, noted, however, that 
transactions in which the currency was actually delivered within two days 
and forward transactions involving actual delivery would not be retail 
foreign exchange transactions subject to its regulation.357 
The Federal Reserve Board (Fed) also adopted rules allowing banks to 
engage in retail foreign exchange transactions.  Among other things, those 
rules require member banks to be well capitalized,358 and they must notify 
the Fed if they offer such products.359  Fraud is prohibited,360 and customers 
are required to be given a prescribed risk disclosure statement that discloses 
the percentage of customers losing and making money in retail foreign 
currency transactions through the bank.361  A minimum margin of two 
percent of the notional amount of retail foreign exchange transactions was 
imposed for major currencies and five percent for other currencies.362 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) adopted rules 
for retail foreign exchange transactions that largely tracked those of the 
Fed.363  The OCC required banks offering these products to first obtain its 
permission to do so.364  The FDIC adopted a similar regulatory 
framework.365 
VI. FUNCTIONAL REGULATION BREAKDOWN 
A. Functional Regulation 
The United States has developed a functional system for the regulation 
of financial services.  This regulatory structure seeks to assure that the 
 
 355.  Press Release, CFTC Approves National Futures Association Rules Enhancing 
Protections for Retail Forex Customers (Aug. 27, 2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7219-15 [https://perma.cc/28EM-6G7Q]. 
 356.  17 C.F.R. § 240.15b12-1 (2014).  This rule stated that it would expire on July 31, 
2016, which provides the SEC an opportunity to assess its effects before renewing it.  Id. 
 357.  Id. 
 358.  12 C.F.R. § 240.8 (2015). 
 359.  12 C.F.R. § 240.4 (2015). 
 360.  12 C.F.R. § 240.3 (2015). 
 361.  12 C.F.R. § 240.6 (2015). 
 362.  12 C.F.R. § 349.9 (2012). 
 363.  12 C.F.R. § 48.1 (2014). 
 364.  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Retail Foreign Exchange 
Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 41, 375 (July 14, 2011). 
 365.  12 C.F.R. § 349.1 (2014). 
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same financial product is regulated by a designated regulator wherever the 
product is traded.  Functional regulation thus seeks to compartmentalize 
particular financial services activities into regulatory boxes that do not 
overlap.  For example, the SEC is assigned the role of regulating the 
securities markets, the CFTC is tasked with regulating commodity futures 
and options markets, and bank regulators, such as the Federal Reserve 
Board and the Comptroller of the Currency, are given the responsibility for 
regulating the business of banking.366 
There have been some deviations from the functional regulation model 
in the U.S.  For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was 
amended in 1975 to impose regulation by the SEC over the clearing, 
settlement and transfer of stocks in the securities market.367  That 
legislation was accompanied by a turf war with the bank regulators who did 
not want the SEC regulating bank clearing and settlement activities.368  A 
compromise was reached in which stock clearing, settlements and transfers 
engaged in by banks would be regulated by the “appropriate regulatory 
agency.”369  The “appropriate regulatory agency” was allowed to adopt and 
enforce its own rules governing clearing and transfer of stock.370  However, 
a slight nod was given to functional regulation through requirements that 
the SEC and the appropriate regulatory consult and cooperate with each 
other and give each other advance notice of proposed rules governing 
clearing and transfers.371 
The Government Securities Act of 1986 was another step away from 
functional regulation.372  That legislation subjected non-banks acting as 
dealers in government securities to regulation by the SEC.  However, 
financial institutions, such as banks, were placed outside the SEC’s reach.  
Instead, financial institutions became subject to regulation by the 
“appropriate regulatory agency.”373  The Treasury Department was tasked 
 
 366.  See Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform?, 2 STAN J. L. 
BUS. & FIN. 89 (1995) (discussing functional regulation). 
 367.  15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2010).  The Securities Exchange Act defines a clearing agency 
as a person acting as an intermediary in making payments or deliveries of securities 
transactions or who compares data concerning the settlement of securities transactions.  The 
definition also includes custodians or depositories of securities at a central location.  15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(24) (2010). 
 368.  At that time, there were some 800 bank transfer agents and some 2,700 non-bank 
transfer agents.  See JERRY W. MARKHAM, BROKER DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES 
AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, CREDIT REGULATION, AND CUSTOMER 
PROTECTION § 13:2 (2014) (describing this jurisdictional fight). 
 369.  15 U.S.C. § 78q-1. 
 370.  Id. 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (Oct. 28, 1986). 
 373.  15 U.S.C. § 78o-5. 
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with adopting rules to govern the operations of government securities 
dealers and brokers.374  Those rules were to address the financial 
responsibility, protection of customer securities and balances, 
recordkeeping and reporting of brokers and dealers in government 
securities.375 
The Treasury Department largely adopted SEC broker-dealer rules as 
the basis for the protection of customer funds associated with trading in 
government securities.376  This seemed to be an effort to preserve functional 
regulation by using the same or similar regulation for the same product but 
deviated from that principle by employing more than one regulator to 
regulate the same function, using different rules.  For example, the 
Treasury Department’s capital rule allowed government securities broker-
dealers registered with the SEC to comply with the SEC’s capital rule and 
financial institutions to comply with bank regulator capital requirements.377  
That was a deviation from functional regulation because those capital 
computations were quite different in approach.378 
The passage of the Gramm-Leach–Bliley Act (GLB) in 1999 was 
another blow to functional regulation.379  GLB repealed the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933, which had tried to define and limit the business of banking to 
the acceptance of deposits and making loans.380  However, the Glass-
Steagall barriers were gradually breached over a period of several decades 
as banks sought to expand their financial services into the securities and 
other financial markets.  Those actions were often challenged in court, but 
the banks continued their relentless efforts to expand their financial 
services into the securities and other markets.381  Congress finally threw in 
the towel in 1999 with the passage of GLB. 
 
 374.  15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (b). 
 375.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 400.1 (2006) (outlining Treasury Department Regulations for 
government securities dealers and brokers). 
 376.  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 403.4 (implementing broker-dealer rules in this fashion). 
 377.  17 C.F.R. § 402.1 (2014). 
 378.  For a time, the SEC allowed certain broker-dealers that were a part of a 
consolidated supervised entity to use the Basel Committee’s capital requirement.  However, 
those firms either failed (e.g., Lehman Brothers) or became banks (Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs) or were acquired by banks (Merrill Lynch) during the Financial Crisis in 
2008, and that provision was repealed. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, BROKER DEALER 
OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 
CREDIT REGULATION, AND CUSTOMER PROTECTION §4:42.50 (2014) (describing that rule and 
its failure). 
 379.  Gramm-Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 
1999). 
 380.  Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (June 16, 1933). 
 381.  See also Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers, 
12 U. PENN. L. & BUS. J. 1081, 1095, 1103 (2010) (describing those cases). 
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There was an effort to preserve at least some aspects of functional 
regulation in GLB by requiring banks to push their securities business out 
of the bank and into an affiliated broker-dealer that would be regulated by 
the SEC.382  Nevertheless, a number of securities market activities were 
carved out of these “push out” requirements.  This allowed the bank itself 
to conduct those activities without regulation by the SEC.  Those activities 
included transactions in U.S government securities, trust investment 
activities, municipal bond transactions, certain transactions in asset backed 
debt, commercial paper, dividend reinvestment plans, sweep accounts, 
stock purchase plans and stock custody arrangements.383  This push out 
meant that those activities would not be regulated functionally. 
More slippage in functional regulation occurred with the enactment of 
the CFMA in 2000.384  The SEC and CFTC set the boundaries of their 
respective jurisdictions in 1982 based only somewhat on functional 
regulation grounds, foreign currency being a deviation from that 
principle.385  At that time, the two agencies could not agree on who should 
regulate futures on single stocks, for example IBM.  As a result of that 
disagreement, trading on such instruments was prohibited until the 
enactment of the CFMA in 2000.  The CFMA deviated from the functional 
regulation approach by allowing trading in single stock futures on both 
commodity and stock exchanges, separately regulated respectively by the 
CFTC and SEC.  The place of its trading, rather than the functional 
product, thus determined whether the CFTC or SEC had jurisdiction to 
regulate.  In order to preserve some aspects of functional regulation, the 
SEC and CFTC were required to jointly adopt regulations for single stock 
futures.386  However, that arrangement still left some regulatory differences.  
For example, an investor trading a single stock future on a stock exchange 
would have the protection of SIPC insurance.  SIPC provides up to 
$500,000 in insurance to cover losses caused by a broker-dealer’s 
insolvency.  A customer trading the same single stock future on a DCM 
 
 382.  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5). 
 383.  Id. Many banks are still subject to indirect regulation by the SEC when they 
become public companies.  In such cases the bank must register its securities with the SEC 
and is subject to the SEC’s periodic reporting requirements.  See, e.g., Bank of America 
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009) (exemplifying Bank of America’s 
compliance with SEC reporting requirements). 
 384.  Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763, §102 (2000). 
 385.  Markham, supra note 300 and accompanying text (describing the division of 
jurisdiction between SEC and CFTC). 
 386.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2(1)(D), 17 C.F.R. § 41.41 (implementing the dual regulation of this 
product). 
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would have no such protection.387 
The use of multiple regulators for the same product expanded with the 
manipulation of California electricity prices by Enron and other energy 
companies in 2000 and 2001.388  The CFTC brought a number of 
manipulation actions as a result of those activities.389  It was joined by the 
Justice Department in some of those cases.  One such case was brought 
against BP Products of North America Inc. (BP).  That company paid $178 
million to settle CFTC charges and an additional $125 million to settle 
criminal charges over the same conduct—a total of $303 million.390  
However, the Fifth Circuit threw out a criminal case brought against the BP 
traders who engaged in the conduct that was the subject of those 
settlements, finding that the trading was not subject to regulation under the 
CEA.391 
The SEC and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
also made an appearance in these prosecutions.  The SEC claimed that 
manipulative trades by the energy companies had inflated the earnings they 
reported in their SEC filings.392  FERC claimed that these activities violated 
its competition requirements for pipelines and regulated utilities.  Reliant 
Resources, Inc., (Reliant), for example, was the subject of enforcement 
proceedings by the SEC, the CFTC, and FERC.  Reliant paid $50 million to 
settle the FERC charges and $18 million to settle the CFTC claims.  It 
additionally agreed to pay $445 million to settle claims brought by the 
attorney generals of various states.  The Justice Department also criminally 
prosecuted Reliant, but those charges were later dropped.393 
Congress responded to these actions in a non-functional way.  Instead 
of consolidating regulation of energy trading into a single regulator, in 
 
 387.  The differences in the regulation of single stock futures by the SEC and CFTC are 
described in a uniform disclosure statement that must be given to customers of those 
products.  See 67 Fed. Reg. 64176 (Oct. 17, 2002) (describing disclosure statement).  See 
also Risk Disclosure Statement for Security Futures Contracts, NFA Compliance Rule 2-
30(B), (Rev. Jan. 3, 2011) (describing disclosure and risk information in the National 
Futures Association manual). 
 388.  See Jerry W. Markham & Lawrence Hunt Jr., The California Energy Crisis—
Enron’s Gaming of Governor Gray’s Imperfect Market, 24 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 
1 (2004) (describing those manipulations). 
 389.  See Jerry W. Markham, Lawrence Hunt Jr., & Michael S. Sackheim, Market 
Manipulation—From Star Chamber to Lone Star Chamber, 23 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. 
REP. 7 (2003) (describing those cases). 
 390.  CFTC Press Release No. 5405-07, BP Agrees to Pay a Total of $303 Million in 
Sanctions to Settle Charges of Manipulation and Attempted Manipulation in the Propane 
Market (Oct. 25, 2007) (on file with CFTC). 
 391.  United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 392.  See MARKHAM, supra note 289 (describing these actions). 
 393.  Id. at 281-282. 
ARTICLE 4 (MARKHAM) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/22/16  9:11 PM 
2016] REGULATING THE MONEYCHANGERS 853 
 
2005, Congress granted FERC greater powers to attack energy price 
manipulations394 through language that tracked the provisions of the SEC’s 
anti-manipulation provisions in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.395  Not satisfied with that expansion of manipulative authority, 
Congress acted again in 2006 to give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
the same anti-manipulation powers that it gave FERC for energy price 
manipulations and which was later granted to the CFTC by the Dodd-Frank 
Act in 2010.396  This means that four regulators (CFTC, SEC, FERC, FTC), 
plus the Justice Department have the same powers for regulating energy 
price manipulations.  They will undoubtedly engage in duplicative actions 
in future energy manipulation cases, as they have in the past.397 
These breakdowns to the functional regulation model bloomed into 
something much greater in the Dodd-Frank Act.  That legislation allocated 
jurisdiction over previously unregulated swap transactions between the 
SEC and CFTC.398  The CFTC was given jurisdiction over commodity 
based swaps, while the SEC assumed control over security based swaps.399  
This meant that swaps as a financial tool were not regulated functionally.  
The jurisdictional line between the SEC and CFTC was not drawn on the 
instrument being traded, i.e., the swap.  Rather, jurisdiction was allocated 
on the basis of the underlying asset that is the subject of the swap, i.e., 
commodity swaps for the CFTC and security swaps for the SEC.  There is 
nothing functional in such an approach.  It was also wasteful in application.  
While the SEC and CFTC engaged in some joint rulemaking in defining 
swaps and swap market participants,400 they went their separate ways in 
promulgating business conduct rules for swaps falling within their 
respective regulatory reach.401 
 
 394.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1283, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
 395.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 396.  Energy Independence and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(2007). 
 397.  Indeed, FERC and the CFTC have already engaged in a war over whether they had 
concurrent jurisdiction over a large energy trader who was alleged to be manipulating 
natural gas futures.  The D.C. Circuit ruled that the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction over 
energy futures.  Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 398.  See Markham, supra note 321, at A-51 (describing this legislation). 
 399.  Id. 
 400.  This joint rulemaking was done in consultation with the Federal Reserve Board. 
See, Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap 
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant”, 
77 Fed. Reg. 30, 596 (May 23, 2012) (comprising the joint final rule). 
 401.  See 17 C.F.R. § 23.400 (describing the CFTC swap business conduct rules).  The 
SEC proposed such business conduct rules in 2011 but has not adopted those rules as of July 
10, 2015; SEC, Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major 
Security-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (July 18, 2011) (describing business 
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This move away from functional regulation was even more 
pronounced in allocating regulation of the foreign exchange market.  As 
described above, The Futures Trading Act of 1982 and the Reauthorization 
Act of 2008402 acted to open up foreign exchange trading to SEC regulated 
broker-dealers.403  As also described above, the Dodd-Frank Act went 
further and allocated jurisdiction over retail foreign exchange derivatives 
among the SEC, the CFTC, the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board and the 
FDIC, who were joined by the NFA and FINRA.404  The Dodd-Frank Act 
allocation of this jurisdiction was not functionally based.  Rather, it was 
entity specific regulation, i.e., broker-dealers selling retail foreign exchange 
options are subject to the regulation of the SEC, FCMs selling the same 
product are subject to the rules of the CFTC, and banks offering the 
identical product are subject to the rules of the bank regulators.  As the 
CFTC staff has noted, Dodd-Frank: 
permits several types of entities to act as counterparties to retail 
forex transactions, [but] the question of who regulates the activity 
depends on the type of entity offering to be the counterparty. For 
example, SEC-registered brokers or dealers doing retail forex 
transactions are regulated by the SEC and financial institutions 
are regulated by banking regulators. The CEA provides that the 
CFTC has jurisdiction over [futures commission merchants], 
[retail foreign exchange dealers], or entities that are not otherwise 
regulated.405 
B. A Reassessment of Business Conduct Regulation is Needed 
The functional system of regulation employed in the U.S. was largely 
the result of legislation that was passed in the 1930s, at a time when 
financial services were segmented and had little overlap.406  These 
separated financial services were carried out by distinct entities such as 
 
conduct standards). 
 402.  Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982), Food 
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008). 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  Markham, supra note 300 and accompanying text (detailing allocation of 
jurisdiction). 
 405.  CFTC Office of Public Affairs, Q & A-Final Retail Foreign Exchange Rules (Sept. 
10, 2010).  Meanwhile, the Treasury Department continues to have exclusive jurisdiction 
over all players in the commercial interbank foreign currency market.  See S. Rep. No. 93-
1131 (1974) (describing the Treasury Amendment); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465 (1997) 
(describing the Treasury Amendment and CFTC jurisdiction). 
 406.  That legislation included the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 1), the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. § 1) and the Glass-Steagall Act that was 
passed in 1933 (Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162). 
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broker-dealers for securities, futures commission merchants for futures and 
banks for taking deposits and making loans.  However, some large banks 
broke that separation in the 1920s through the use of affiliates that acted as 
broker-dealers.  The activities of those affiliates were harshly criticized in 
hearings that led to the passage of the New Deal legislation regulating 
financial services.  The Glass-Steagall Act sought to restore the wall 
between banking and securities by banning banks from engaging in some 
securities market activities.407 
The barriers erected by Glass-Steagall that separated the banking and 
securities markets began breaking down in the 1960s, when large 
commercial and investment banks began expanding their offerings of 
financial services.408  Similarly, the futures exchanges, which had 
traditionally traded only agricultural futures, began trading futures and 
options on financial instruments.  Today, futures and other derivative 
markets are largely devoted to the trading of financial derivatives.409  
Functional regulation was not a good fit for this evolving market structure.  
Instead of a single regulator, or group of regulators in the case of banking, 
large financial services firms and their affiliates were saddled with multiple 
regulators with separate and sometimes conflicting rules. 
This multiplication of regulators burgeoned during the Financial Crisis 
in 2008.  Goldman Sachs, for example, was once regulated only by the 
SEC, but during that crisis it became a bank that is now regulated by 
banking regulators, as well as the SEC and CFTC.  Morgan Stanley 
underwent the same metamorphosis.  Other large banks also face this same 
multiple regulator approach.  For example, Bank of America was involved 
in capital market activities before the Financial Crisis and was subject to 
SEC and CFTC regulation, as well as bank regulation.  That cross sector 
role was expanded by Bank of America during the Financial Crisis when it 
acquired Merrill Lynch, one of the largest broker-dealers in the world.410 
This duplicative and overlapping regulatory structure has led to the 
anomaly of multiple enforcement actions by multiple regulators against the 
same large banks.  This multiple regulator role has resulted in the now 
familiar recurring announcements of mega-settlements by those banks with 
 
 407.  Markham, supra note 383 at 1091-1095 (describing the legislative history of the 
Glass-Steagall Act). 
 408.  See id. at 1081, 1095, 1102 (describing the efforts of banks and broker-dealers to 
expand into each other’s traditional domains). 
 409.  See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of 
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 873-874 
(2008) (describing that transformation). 
 410.  See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 
SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION (2006-2009) 546-557 (2011) (describing those 
developments). 
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those regulators.  These so-called “parallel” actions (i.e., “independent 
investigations conducted by civil regulatory agencies and federal 
prosecutors relating to the same set of operative facts and 
circumstances”)411 were fairly limited before the scandals that emerged 
after the bankruptcy of the Enron Corp. in 2001.  Those scandals spread 
from the energy markets that Enron was manipulating to several financial 
services firms.412  Before the Enron era scandals, the SEC would file its 
own civil actions and make a simultaneous criminal reference to the 
Department of Justice in particularly serious cases of fraud, but such dual 
actions were infrequent.  That changed with the failure of Enron in 2001 
and the financial services scandals that arose in its wake.  In 1999, there 
were sixty-four such referrals.  That number ballooned to 259 in 2002.413 
The Department of Justice became an active regulator of financial 
services firms during the Enron era scandals by doling out large fines for 
violations of regulatory requirements and by coordinating the multiple 
actions of other regulators.  The Enron era scandals resulted in a Corporate 
Fraud Task Force in 2002 that was headed by the Department of Justice 
and included representatives from the SEC, CFTC and other regulators.  
They began joint investigations and parallel criminal and civil proceedings 
on a broad scale, and that Task Force has continued to expand.414 
The Justice Department website identified the following as members 
of the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2008: 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division 
Assistant Attorney General Tax Division 
United States Attorney for the Central District of California 
United States Attorney for the Northern District of California 
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas  . . . . 
 
 411.  WilmerHale, The Perils of Parallel Proceedings—Is There Light at the End of the 
Tunnel? (April 2006), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/Pu
blication/ICL_BriefSeries_042106.pdf [https://perma.cc/63KR-F79T] (accessed on May 19, 
2015). 
 412.  Markham, supra note 195 at 496 (describing those scandals). 
 413.  WilmerHale, Parallel Criminal and SEC Prosecution Present New Risks for Public 
Companies and their Officers and Directors (August 19, 2003), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=90061 
[https://perma.cc/M62C-G3YS] (accessed on May 19, 2015). 
 414.  Id. 
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 The Secretary of Labor 
 The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
 The Secretary of the Treasury 
The Comptroller of the Currency 
The Director of Office of Thrift Supervision 
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) 
 The Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission 
 The Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission 
 The Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission 
 The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
 The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
 The Chief Inspector of the United States Postal Inspection 
Service 
The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.415 
In 2009, in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Corporate Fraud 
Task Force was renamed the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force 
(Task Force) and was expanded to include six more federal agencies.  The 
Task Force then included ninety-four U.S. attorneys offices and numerous 
“state and local partners.”416  This reference to “state and local partners” 
recognizes that, in addition to federal regulators, financial services firms 
are subject to further oversight by state banking commissions, if they are a 
state bank, fifty-state securities administrators,417 fifty-state state attorney 
generals, the same number of state insurance regulators and, in the case of 
New York, a Department of Financial Services that is charged with, among 
other things, “fighting financial fraud.”418 
The inclusion of state officials among the host of federal financial 
services regulators was another product of the Enron-era scandals.  Serving 
 
 415.  Department of Justice Archives, The President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/ [https://perma.cc/MX3X-DMB4] (accessed on May 
18, 2015). 
 416.  About the Task Force, STOPFRAUD.GOV: FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, 
http://www.stopfraud.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/R82P-65JR] (last visited May 18, 
2015). 
 417.  See Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 
UTAH L. REV. 101 (1997) (explaining that the titular legislation preempted state securities 
laws with respect to actively traded securities regulated by the SEC). 
 418.  About Us, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. SERV., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/dfs_about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/DV25-UB7C] (last visited May 16, 2015). 
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as attorney general in New York during that period, Eliot Spitzer brought 
numerous high profile cases against financial institutions, often in 
competition with the SEC.419  The press Spitzer garnered from those 
prosecutions catapulted him into the New York governor’s mansion and 
made him a viable candidate for the Presidency, that is until a scandal led 
to his downfall.420  Other state officials joined the fray during the Enron-era 
scandals.  For example, a wolf pack of forty state officials joined Spitzer in 
an investigation of financial analysts employed by several large investment 
banks.  Those state regulators drew lots to determine which regulators 
would lead investigations of particular investment banks.  Utah drew 
Goldman Sachs as its target, which must have raised some eyebrows in 
Goldman’s New York headquarters.421  Those investigations led to a 
massive settlement by several large investment banks in which they agreed 
to pay $1.4 billion to New York and to a long list of state and federal 
regulators.422 
The financial analyst settlement became the model for the massive 
fines imposed by multiple regulators in the wake of the Financial Crisis of 
2008.  For example, a few years after that settlement, another pack of thirty 
state attorney generals joined the CFTC, bank regulators, and the 
Department of Justice in investigating the manipulation of the Libor and 
other benchmark interest rates by several large banks.423  Regulators from 
the U.K, Japan, Europe, Canada and Singapore were also involved.424  
Those investigations resulted in billions of dollars in settlements.425  In one 
settlement, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay $2.5 billion to settle claims over 
interest rate manipulation that were brought by the CFTC, the Justice 
Department, the New York Department of Financial Services, and the UK 
Financial Conduct Authority; Deutsche Bank had previously paid nearly $1 
billion to settle claims by the European Union over interest rate 
manipulations.426 
 
 419.   See MARKHAM, supra note 196, at 411 (describing Spitzer’s prosecutions and his 
rise and fall as a national figure). 
 420.   Id. at xxxi. 
 421.   Id. at 411-412. 
 422.   Id. at 416. 
 423.  Jean Eaglesham, Ruling in Rate Probe Doesn’t Slow Cases, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 
2013, at C1. 
 424.  See MARKHAM, supra note 289, at 341 (further describing those investigations). 
 425.  See supra notes 198, 200, and 201 (summarizing various settlements reached for 
billion dollar amounts). 
 426.  Eyk Henning & David Enrich, Deutsche Bank to Pay $2.5 Billion to Settle Libor 
Investigation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2015. The CFTC and Department of Justice entered into 
a $453 million settlement with Barclays PLC in June 2012. The bank was charged with 
attempting to manipulate the Libor rate by inserting artificially low quotes in the index 
during the Financial Crisis. That action was taken to aid trading positions and to conceal 
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The November 2014 foreign exchange manipulation case settlement 
for $4.3 billion, which is described above,427 involved six banks and 
various domestic and foreign regulators (i.e., the CFTC, the OCC, the U.K 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority).428  The large BONY foreign exchange settlement 
involved the New York and Florida attorney generals, the Justice 
Department, the Labor Department and the SEC.429  After those 
settlements, Brazil announced that its antitrust authorities were 
investigating fifteen large international banks, including several of those 
involved in the foreign exchange and Libor settlements, to determine if 
they were manipulating currency exchange rates.430 
 
from the market that Barclays was paying higher rates in order to attract funds. Alexander 
Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays Paying $453 million to Settle Libor Probe, REUTERS, June 
27, 2012. On December 19, 2012, A UBS AG subsidiary in Japan pleaded guilty to a 
criminal charge for manipulating the Libor rate. UBS also agreed to pay civil and criminal 
fines totaling $1.5 billion to settle interest rate charges made by U.S., U.K. and Swiss 
authorities. David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in ‘Epic’ Plot, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012.  The Royal Bank of Scotland agreed to pay $612 million to 
settle charges brought by U.S. and U.K. authorities over its Libor rate manipulations. Matt 
Scuffham & Kristin Ridley, Exclusive: RBS Fined $612 Million for Rate Rigging, REUTERS, 
Feb. 6, 2013. U.S. and U.K. regulators fined ICAP, an inter-dealer broker, $87 million for 
the alleged manipulation of the Libor. Kristin Ridley, Clare Hutchison & Aruna 
Viswanatha, ICAP Fined $87 Million Over Libor, Three Former Staff Charged, REUTERS, 
Sept. 25, 2013.  In October 2013, the Dutch Rabobank agreed to pay $1 billion to settle 
charges that it manipulated the Libor rate. That settlement was with the CFTC, the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority and Dutch regulators. Chad 
Bray, Dutch Bank Settles Case Over Libor Deceptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013. In 
December 2013, European Union regulators fined six large financial institutions $2.32 
billion for manipulating the Libor rate. Those firms included JPMorgan, Citigroup, 
Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland and Société Générale S.A., some of which were 
later targeted for the same conduct by other regulators. Vanessa Mock & David Enrich, EU 
Fines 6 Firms on Rates – Total Penalty of $2.32 Billion is Bloc’s Largest in Case Against 
Cartel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2013. Lloyds Banking Group PLC agreed to pay $370 million 
to U.S. and U.K. authorities in July 2014 to settle charges over its alleged repo rate 
manipulations. Max Colchester, Lloyds Settles Rate-Rig Probe, WALL ST. J., Jul. 29, 2014. 
 427.  See FCA, supra note 203 (detailing the relevant case against banks whose traders 
attempted to manipulate market currency rates). 
 428.  See Ring & Vaughan, supra note 204 (detailing the regulatory bodies involved in 
the settlement reports). 
 429.  See supra notes 217 and 218 (accounting for the separate actions brought by the 
Justice Department, the Department of Labor, the SEC, New York attorney general, and the 
Florida attorney general). 
 430.  Guillermo Parra-Bernal & Leonardo Goy, Brazil Probes Currency Market Activity 
of 15 Global Banks, REUTERS, July 2, 2015.  Another storm is brewing over claims that 
large banks manipulated the market for U.S. Treasury securities.  A class action lawsuit 
filed in July 2015 has charged that twenty-two large banks and financial services firms that 
act as primary dealers in that market manipulated their prices in 2012.  The Treasury market 
is valued at $12.5 trillion, so this will be no small matter, and the press was reporting an 
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As exemplified by the foreign exchange manipulation cases, parallel 
proceedings have become the norm for prosecuting large financial 
institutions.  However, it is hard to fathom the value of this redundant 
regulation by multiple regulators of the same banks.  It serves no useful 
purpose other than to milk banks, regardless of guilt or harm, for billions of 
dollars that they must pay in order to preserve their franchise, which 
depends on multiple government licenses (e.g. FCM, broker-dealer and 
banking registrations).  These settlements merely act as a random tax on 
those institutions, a tax that is borne by innocent shareholders in the form 
of reduced earnings, which diminish stock value and dividends. Consumers 
will also bear some of this burden as they will be charged increased fees to 
offset the effects of those massive fines.431 
Reform is necessary, but for the approximately twenty-five financial 
regulatory reform efforts that occurred after World War II, attempts at 
reform have all been unsuccessful.432  Reform efforts seemed to have 
gained some traction in this century when, in 2004, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) published a report on regulatory reform in 
which it stated that “some have questioned whether a fragmented 
regulatory system is appropriate in today’s environment, particularly with 
large, complex firms managing their risks on a consolidated basis.”433 
The GAO report was followed by an extended and extensive review of 
the effectiveness of functional regulation by the Treasury Department that 
was concluded in 2007.  The Treasury Department then urged that 
 
investigation by the Justice Department of these claims. Jonathan Stempel, Lawsuit Accuses 
22 Banks of Manipulating U.S. Treasury Auctions, REUTERS, July 23, 2015.  This is not the 
first time that the Treasury market has been manipulated. In 1992, Paul Mozer, a trader at 
Salomon Brothers, now a part of Citigroup, was the subject of criminal charges for 
manipulating the two-year Treasury market through massive purchases of those notes at 
Treasury auctions. The Treasury Department had limited the amount of notes or bonds that 
any one dealer could purchase at a Treasury auction for two-year notes to 35 percent of the 
offering. Mozer used customer accounts without their permission to buy 86 percent of the 
May 1992 two-year Treasury note auction. In one auction, Mozer entered an unauthorized 
order for $1 billion for the account of a single customer. Mozer was sent to jail for four 
months and his firm was fined $290 million. See MARKHAM, supra note 289, at 252-253 
(2014) (describing that and other Treasury market manipulation cases). 
 431.  The disposition of these fines is another matter that needs examination. In England, 
the government was using the Libor settlement for such things as giving the “hippie scouts” 
some $750,000 to teach children about peace and cooperation through parachute games and 
musical chairs.  Another $1.5 million was given to support a celebration of the battle of 
Agincourt. Money was also given to a “therapeutic baker” for veterans. Margot Patrick, 
England’s Bank Fines Are a Boon for a Happy Few – Agincourt Celebration, ‘hippie 
scouts’ get some of $1 billion in Libor cash, WALL ST. J. May 30, 2015. 
 432.  A Former Central Banker Turns on His Own Kind, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2015. 
 433.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT 
NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2004). 
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functional regulation be abandoned on the basis that it was ineffective and 
costly.434  The Treasury Secretary recommended a consolidation of U.S. 
financial services regulation into three bodies, viz., (1) a market stability 
regulator, which would be the Federal Reserve Board empowered to set 
monetary policy and monitor systemic economic threats; (2) a prudential 
financial regulator, which would oversee government insured banks and 
broker-dealers and adopt rules for the protection of those industries’ 
government insurance funds (FDIC and SIPC); and (3) a business conduct 
regulator that would regulate business conduct across all financial 
services.435  As an interim step the Department’s report recommended the 
consolidation of the CFTC and SEC.436 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 killed any possibility of enactment of the 
Treasury Department’s recommended reforms, which may seem strange.  
The multiple regulators involved in that crisis were anything but functional, 
finding themselves often at odds with each other during the crisis and doing 
nothing to prevent or anticipate the crisis.437  Yet, instead of reducing the 
number of regulators, Congress added even more with the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.  Among other things, Dodd-Frank created the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which now enforces 
federal consumer financial laws such as prohibitions against credit 
discrimination.438  The CFPB is already following the now familiar path of 
parallel and redundant enforcement actions.439  Dodd-Frank also created a 
new super-regulator, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 
whose members and advisors comprise a broad range of federal and state 
financial services regulators; FSOC is responsible for regulating 
systemically important financial services firms.440  However, most of those 
businesses are financial services firms that are already intensively regulated 
 
 434.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE (2008). 
 435.  Id. at 139-144. 
 436.  Id. at 106-111. 
 437.  See MARKHAM, supra note 412 (describing those failures). 
 438.  About Us, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/KGP4-JSC8] (last visited 
June 28, 2015). 
 439.  For example, in January 2015 CFPB announced a joint investigation with the 
Maryland attorney general and Maryland Insurance Administration that resulted in joint 
settlement with Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase for $35.7 million.  CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB TAKES ACTION AGAINST WELLS FARGO AND JPMORGAN CHASE 
FOR ILLEGAL MORTGAGE KICKBACKS, (2015). 
 440.  See Jerry W. Markham, The Financial Stability Oversight Council—Risk Manager 
or Debating Society?, 33 THE CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 35 (2011) (describing 
the role and participants in FSOC). 
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by multiple other regulators.441 
The functional multiple regulator approach taken by the U.S. has not 
been followed by the rest of the world.  At the turn of the century, the 
United Kingdom consolidated multiple regulators and self-regulators for 
financial services into a single body, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).442  Indeed, most other countries followed that model.  However, the 
FSA was heavily criticized for its lax regulation before and during the 
Financial Crisis of 2008.  The U.K. then moved to a “Twin Peaks” 
regulatory approach, which the Netherlands and Australia also use.443 
Under the Twin Peaks regulatory approach adopted by the U.K. there 
is a single bank regulator, the Bank of England, for prudential supervision, 
and a single regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), for business 
conduct covering all financial services, including banking, securities, 
currency exchange, derivatives and insurance.444  Whether that change will 
survive the next financial storm is unknown, but the FCA is becoming 
increasingly aggressive in its regulation as demonstrated by its participation 
in the Libor and foreign exchange settlements described above.445 
The regulatory dysfunction that continues in the U.S. is not being 
completely ignored today.  No less a personage than former Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, a true believer in regulation, came 
out in favor of more consolidated regulation in 2015.  Among other things, 
his proposal would consolidate the CFTC and SEC.446  That 
recommendation should be pursued, and the foreign exchange market 
provides an ideal laboratory for an experiment to determine if consolidated 
regulation would be more effective than the present morass. 
As has been described above, jurisdiction in foreign exchange markets 
has been allocated among five regulators viz., the CFTC, SEC, OCC, FDIC, 
and the Federal Reserve Board.  Each and every regulator has promulgated 
 
 441.  See Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank 
[https://perma.cc/Q6TL-HXME] (last visited June 30, 2015) (describing the non-bank firms 
designated as systemically significant). 
 442.  Who are we?, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/who/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/BC3R-TQTZ] (last 
visited July 30, 2015). 
 443.  See Markham, supra note 298, at 547 (describing these regulatory approaches). 
 444.  See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 504-
507 (Jerry W. Markham & Rigers Gjyshi eds., 2014) (describing the change in financial 
regulation in the U.K.). 
 445.  See supra notes 426 and 443 and accompanying text (noting involvement of FCA 
in the large Libor and foreign exchange settlements). 
 446.  The Volcker proposal quickly came under criticism from the proponents of 
multiple independent regulators. Emmanuel Olaoye, Former U.S. CFTC Chair Criticizes 
Volcker Call to Merge Agency With SEC, REUTERS, May 20, 2015). 
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separate regulations for essentially the same product. There is no need for 
this redundancy.  A single business conduct regulator should be responsible 
for all retail foreign exchange activities, which are largely integrated into 
the operations of a handful of large banks in the commercial interbank 
market and a relatively small number of retail dealers.  A single regulator 
should be able to look across and regulate the full range of those financial 
services.447 
Of course, any effort to create a single business conduct regulator will 
encounter stiff resistance from the agencies that regulate foreign exchange.  
Have no doubt, they will fight desperately for survival and to maintain their 
turf.  The several decades of unsuccessful efforts to combine the CFTC and 
SEC demonstrate this.448  However, this resistance is a political matter that 
needs to be overcome by demonstrating the true extent of redundancy in 
the regulation of financial services and how wasteful such redundant 
regulation is in application.  Consolidation of regulation of the foreign 
exchange market would be a good way to make such a demonstration.  This 
would also be an additional ground for consolidating the SEC and CFTC 
into a single agency that could then act as a single regulator over all 
products previously within their jurisdictions as well as foreign exchange.  
Both of these agencies have experience in regulating foreign exchange, and 
both have as their mission the sanctioning of fraud and manipulation.  In 
addition, removing the bank regulators from business conduct 
responsibility for foreign exchange would restore them to their traditional 
role of prudential regulation governing the safety and soundness of banks 
and our banking system.  That prudential regulation would include 
continuing supervision over foreign exchange payment and settlement 
systems that are largely used by banks in the inter-bank foreign exchange 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
The regulation of the foreign currency exchange market demonstrates 
that functional regulation has broken down and jurisdictional boundaries 
are being set by entity and not by product.  It would be a useful experiment 
to consolidate that regulation of the foreign exchange market into a single 
business conduct authority with a single set of rules.  If successful, other 
business conduct regulation could be consolidated as well. 
 
 
 447.  See supra note 446 (documenting the UK “twin peaks” model with a single bank 
regulator and a single business conduct regulator). 
 448.  See Markham, supra note 298 (describing those efforts). 
